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THE EFFECTS OF REJECTING MIND-BODY
DUALISM ON U.S. LAW
MATTHEW W. LAWRENCE*
ABSTRACT
While neuroscience continues to make it clearer that mental pro-
cesses, effects, disorders, and states can be described through physical
observation, the metaphysical notion of mind-body dualism still per-
vades the U.S. legal system. In this Article, I discuss many areas
where mind-body dualism holds fast, and others where mind-body
dualism has already been explicitly or impliedly rejected. I argue that
in most areas, the dualist distinction would have little to no impact on
the values the law already describes. However, I argue that rejecting
dualism would have an impact on fundamental rights analyses. First
Amendment free speech rights, fundamental rights, and substantive
due process doctrine, and particularly as related to the negative rights
of children and their parents’ rights to raise them, change when seen
as involving indelible physical processes. Discussing some relevant
Constitutional doctrines, I explain what changes to the analysis follow
as a matter of logic, while also discussing normative considerations
that would arise. Assuming that dualism is false, I conclude that cer-
tain types of now-protected speech and expression would need to be
reconsidered because of their potential to physically harm listeners
and cause harm generally throughout society. I argue that children
should be provided with a robust set of certain negative freedoms due
to the physical and sometimes permanent changes that occur in young
brains subject to, for example, racist or anti-LGBTQ ideology. When
seen as more than merely mental, some of the speech currently pro-
tected in the U.S. presents a public health issue that needs to be
addressed at the most fundamental level.
INTRODUCTION
I. DUALISM AS A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLE
II. AREAS WHERE THE LAW ALREADY REJECTS DUALISM
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A. Standards Relating to Relevant Evidence
1. In General
2. Insanity Defense
B. Voluntary Manslaughter
C. Unprotected Speech
III. WHEN DUALISM PREVAILS: WHERE IT MATTERS AND WHERE IT
DOES NOT
A. Mens Rea
1. Categories of Blame
2. Forming Intent
B. Mental Versus Physical Tort Damages
C. Testimonial Versus Bodily Evidence
D. First Amendment Free Speech Doctrine
1. Dualism and Protected Speech in General
2. Detailing the Problem
3. Speech and the First Amendment
4. Parental Rights Under the Constitution
5. Specifying the Physical Harm of Racist Ideology
6. The Right to Be Free from the Physical Harms of
Racist Ideology
7. Counter-Argument from Religious Freedom
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Mind-body dualism (“dualism”) is the belief that there is a cate-
gorical difference between the physical body and the mind.1 Prevailing
ancient thinkers in Western Civilization up through Modernity posited
the mind and the body as existing in different conceptual dimensions,
where the processes of the mind were not caused by or, in some cases,
even related to those of the body or the physical stuff in the world.2
1. Neeta Mehta, Mind-Body Dualism: A Critique from a Health Perspective, 9 MENS
SANA MONOGRAPH 202, 202 (Jan. 2011).
2. See e.g., ARISTOTLE, 1 THE COMPLETE WORKS: ON THE SOUL bk. 656 (edited by
Johnathan Barnes 1984) (“Now given that there are bodies of such and such a kind, viz.
having life, the soul cannot be a body, for the body is the subject or matter, not what is
attributed to it.”); 7 AUGUSTINE, The Confessions of Saint Augustine bk. III, in AUGUSTINE:
CONFESSIONS AND ENCHIRIDION 61, 67–68 (Albert C. Outler trans., 1955) (“The bodies them-
selves are more certain than the images, yet even these thou art not. Thou art not even
the soul, which is the life of bodies; and, clearly, the life of the body is better than the body
itself.”); Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy 28, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS
OF DESCARTES 1, 28 (Elizabeth S. Haldane trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1911) (c. 1641
C.E.) (“And although possibly (or rather certainly, as I shall say in a moment) I possess a
body with which I am very intimately conjoined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear
and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as,
on the other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an extended and
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Historically, people who followed traditional Abrahamic religious
faiths generally believed in this brand of dualism, where the soul,
god, heaven, and hell persist in a realm outside of the body and are
not subject to the laws of physics or empirical observation.3 Recently,
some proponents of Abrahamic faiths have argued against mind-body
dualism in light of the discoveries of neuroscience.4 Those discoveries
also inform my view.
Most contemporary philosophers who subscribe to mind-body
dualism hold that mental processes are, in fact, caused by physical
processes, but that the mind remains outside of the reach of observ-
able, physical analysis.5 In this contemporary iteration, naturalistic
dualism, the quality of mental experience is beyond the reach of physi-
cal explanatory power.6 According to naturalistic dualism, while many
specific phenomena that make up mental function can be and have
been readily described by empirical observation, the totality of quali-
ties making up subjective experience are such that quantitative analy-
sis is unable to adequately explain them at this time.7 This so-called
“hard problem of consciousness” poses difficult epistemic and other
philosophical questions for those who argue in favor of a non-dualist
conception of the mind and consciousness.8 Here, since this Article
simply assumes that dualism is false and that the physical, observable
unthinking thing, it is certain that this I [that is to say, my soul by which I am what I
am], is entirely and absolutely distinct from my body, and can exist without it.”); 1 JOHN
LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. 1, at 91 (1823) (“[T]hat what-
ever ideas the mind can receive and contemplate without the help of the body . . . it is
reasonable to think-retain without the help of the body too. If not, then the soul, gets
little advantage by thinking.”); PLATO, PHAEDRUS 30–31 (Alexander Nehamas & Paul
Woodruff trans., 1995) (“To describe what the soul actually is would require a very long ac-
count, altogether a task for a god in every way; but to say what it is like is humanly
possible and takes less time. So let us do the second in our speech. Let us then liken the
soul to the natural union of a team of winged horses and their charioteer.”)
3. HELEN DE CRUZ & JOHAN DE SMEDT, A NATURAL HISTORY OF NATURAL THEOLOGY:
THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 44 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2015).
4. NANCEY MURPHY, BODIES AND SOULS, OR SPIRITED BODIES? 3–5 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2006).
5. E.g., Tomas Bogardus, Undefeated Dualism, 165 PHIL. STUD. 445, 445 (2013); David
J. Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, 2 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 200
(1995); Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, 83 PHIL. REV. 435, 435–36 (Oct. 1974).
6. Because common sense tells us that there are physical bodies, and because
there is intellectual pressure towards producing a unified view of the world,
one could say that materialist monism is the “default option”. Discussion
about dualism, therefore, tends to start from the assumption of the reality
of the physical world, and then to consider arguments for why the mind can-
not be treated as simply part of that world.
Howard Robinson, Dualism, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Feb. 29, 2016), https://plato.stanford
.edu/entries/dualism [https://perma.cc/6EKE-N8VZ].
7. See Chalmers, supra note 5, at 202–03.
8. See id. at 201.
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world is all there is, it is sufficient to describe this problem without
solving it. I describe the problem merely to help frame the issue, not
to delve into the philosophical debate.
In contrast to dualism, mind-body monism (“monism”) is the idea
that there is only one thing or one substance that underlies all things.9
Typically, monists posit that everything is physical, although avowed
monist and Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza posited that only god
really existed.10 Monists typically hold that, while humans are able
to conceptualize different things within the Universe, we do so some-
what arbitrarily.11 For instance, the difference between the Earth
and the Sun is obvious, but at the same time, they are a part of the
exact same system. That we define them separately is a matter of
conceptual distinction. Depending on the conceptual level of analysis,
they are either the same or different. This illustrates, under a monist
perspective, there may only be an arbitrary distinction between the
mind and the body.12
To reject dualism seems to infer that monism is true, but the
more accurate inference is that physicalism is true.13 Physicalism is
the idea that all things are physical in their causes and essences.14
Ancient schools of thought such as Epicureanism, Stoicism, and
many contemporary philosophers, especially those using scientific
explanations to underpin their theories, posit physicalism.15 How-
ever, dualism is present throughout the U.S. legal system in various
ways.16 For example, damages bars and limitations on “merely” men-
tal tortious harm, compelling testimony versus bodily evidence, the
idea that mens rea requirements are only mental in nature, and the
free expression of ideas are some areas where mind-body dualism
prevails.17 I am interested in how the law would, could, and should
change if dualism is false.
An antecedent assumption necessary for the sake of this argu-
ment is that the law could possibly develop without the assumption
9. See Robinson, supra note 6.
10. “Since God is the only possible substance, it is impossible for any other substance
besides God to exist.” Samuel Newlands, Spinoza’s Modal Metaphysics, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL.
(Sept. 14, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-modal/#Sub [https://perma.cc
/M3JN-H285] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
11. See Monism, THE BASICS OF PHIL., https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_mon
ism.html [https://perma.cc/6NKA-NZKC].
12. See Komala B. Patil, Two Schools of Thought in Philosophy—Dualism vs.
Monism, PYSCHOLOGENIE (Mar. 26, 2018), https://psychologenie.com/dualism-vs-monism
-in-philosophy [https://perma.cc/64SK-3DMA].
13. See Tim Crane, Dualism, Monism, Physicalism, 1 MIND & SOC’Y 73, 73 (2000).
14. See id. at 76.
15. Daniel Stoljar, Physicalism, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REV. (June 27, 2012), https://ndpr
.nd.edu/news/physicalism [https://perma.cc/VJQ7-YWR9].
16. See Dov Fox & Alex Stein, Dualism and Doctrine, 90 IND. L.J. 975, 977 (2015).
17. See id.
2019] THE EFFECTS OF REJECTING MIND-BODY DUALISM 81
that dualism is true. I think this is a safe assumption because dualism
is a complication of what could be thought of as a simpler problem.
Specifically, dualism requires acknowledging the physical world plus
an unobservable “mental” construction of what some other worldly
set of concepts are like.18 Howard Robinson describes this succinctly
in an article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Dualism.”
Because common sense tells us that there are physical bodies,
and because there is intellectual pressure towards producing a
unified view of the world, one could say that materialist monism
is the ‘default option’. Discussion about dualism, therefore, tends
to start from the assumption of the reality of the physical world,
and then to consider arguments for why the mind cannot be
treated as simply part of that world.19
Many dualists assume that concepts like the mind and conscious-
ness can be explained through deductive reasoning even though they
lie outside of our perception.20 Since dualist mental concepts are, by
their very nature, not explainable as part of the observable world21—
even if dualism is true and there are negative consequences of reject-
ing it in this world or in the other dimension in which the dualist
concepts of the mind are purported to exist—humans are capable of
both having laws and not subscribing to dualism at the same time.
It is sufficient to say that it is possible to have a legal system without
endorsing dualism.
In this Article, I assume that dualism is false, and ask: so what?
How does the dualist approach lead to different ethical considerations
and, therefore, legal standards? While it is interesting to ponder what
the law would be like had it developed ex nihilo, I will take today’s
standards as they are and consider what would happen if the U.S.
legal system explicitly recognized that dualism is false in every case.
I will not argue here that dualism is wrong,22 nor do I attempt to
show that dualist attitudes lead to bad outcomes like neglect of
18. See Robinson, supra note 6.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Though it should become clear that I think applying dualistic notions is contra-
dictory and wrong in the discussion below surrounding the First Amendment. Compare
with Fox & Stein, supra note 16, at 975 (“This Article critically examines the entrenchment
of mind-body dualism in the Supreme Court doctrines of harm, compulsion, and inten-
tionality. It uses novel insights from neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry to expose
dualism as empirically flawed and conceptually bankrupt. We demonstrate how the fiction
of dualism distorts the law and why the most plausible reasons for dualism’s persistence
cannot save it. We introduce an integrationist model of human action and experience that
spells out the conditions under which to uproot dualism’s pernicious influence within our
legal system.”).
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bodily health.23 Instead, I argue what the consequences are for the
U.S. legal system if dualism is recognized to be false and a unified,
physicalist picture of bodies and minds was adopted. While the
scope of this Article is limited, I will address specific areas that elu-
cidate principles that would follow from a strictly physical approach
to mental phenomena.
In Part I, I explain the history of dualism in U.S. legal thought.
In Part II, I discuss implicit rejections of dualism in the law, namely
in evidentiary standards, the concept of involuntary manslaughter,
and in specific areas of speech law. In Part III, I address the areas
where dualism currently appears in the law and analyze how these
areas are affected upon rejecting dualism. The categories addressed
in Part III are: (a) mens rea, both broadly and specifically regarding in-
tent, (b) mental versus physical tort damages, (c) testimonial versus
bodily/physical evidence, and (d) free association, speech and expres-
sion doctrine, specifically related to child-rearing, where the focus
is especially on the way rejecting dualism should affect the freedom
parents have to teach children racist ideologies. In addressing each
of these areas, I provide some closing remarks meant to touch on
some of the normative issues that arise.
Others who have addressed this issue by taking up the broad top-
ics of free will, responsibility, blameworthiness, and action,24 but I will
begin my analyses from discreet topics within legal doctrine that are
affected by dualist notions and work my way to the broader implica-
tions that each present. The reasons for this method are simple. The
first is practical. Precedent is extremely important in the U.S. legal
system, so any changes that might come to legal doctrine would and,
arguably, should be informed by the existing laws and their justifi-
cations and not necessarily informed by a particular conception of
consciousness, free will, blameworthiness, action, etc. Second, as will
become clear, accepting that dualism is false does not entail rejecting
any of those broader notions outright, nor does it follow that many of
the legal rules on the books are necessarily problematic just because
the phenomenon they attach to are understood to be physical.
This Article is about the notion of mind-body dualism as a con-
cept, how that concept informs the law, and how the law would change
if it was rejected in favor of a physicalist understanding of the world.
It is not about the epistemic value of neuroscience or the body of sci-
entific knowledge surrounding the brain. In some cases, neuroscience
23. See Matthias Forstmann et al., “The Mind is Willing but the Flesh is Weak”: The
Effects of Mind-Body Dualism on Health Behavior, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1239, 1244 (2012).
24. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COM-
PARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 10–11 (2007); Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Responsibility and
the Disappearing Person, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2545, 2545 (2007).
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provides data that undermines an established legal value, rule, or
standard, but even where the concept of dualism does not bear on
the legal values underlying doctrine, neuroscience is and will con-
tinue to provide important answers.25 While I employ various lessons
and theories from neuroscience to explain my arguments, this Ar-
ticle is not about how neuroscience bears on the law. It is about how
rejecting mind-body dualism as a concept bears on the law.
I. DUALISM AS A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLE
In one of his most famous lines, French philosopher and reformed
psychologist Michel Foucault declared “the soul is the prison of the
body.”26 This declaration flies in the face of conventional wisdom.27
The body actually holds back the soul, right? Isn’t that obvious? Our
souls (“minds”) are able to construct elaborate plans and imagine im-
possible creatures.28 The physical body restrains us from these plans,
and the limits of the physical world set the parameters of possible
creatures29 . . . right? Well, yes and no.30 Foucault was not saying that
humans could do anything but for the mind holding us back.31 He was
saying that the mind is the thing that is manipulated by the devises
of discipline and that the mind constructs prisons for the body it
occupies.32 The mind is the player that creates and adopts rules of
25. [T]here are four types of situations in which neuroscience may be of assis-
tance: (1) data indicating that the folk-psychological assumption underlying
a legal rule is incorrect, (2) data suggesting the need for new or reformed
legal doctrine, (3) evidence that helps adjudicate an individual case, and (4)
data that help efficient adjudication or administration of criminal justice.
Stephen J. Morse, The Promise of Neuroscience for Law: Hope or Hype?, in PALGRAVE
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 77, 90 (David Boonin, ed. 2018).
26. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 30 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1975).
27. See Christian Irigaray, Soma Sema: The Body as a Prison for the Soul.
28. See, e.g., Corey Plante, The Monster in ‘A Quiet Place’ Has Super-Hearing for a
Terrifying Reason, INVERSE (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.inverse.com/article/43674-a-quiet
-place-monster-origins-alien-invasion [https://perma.cc/X79H-QJRD].
29. See James Gallagher, Ultimate Limit of Human Endurance Found, BBC (June 6,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-48527798 [https://perma.cc/2FJA-JXEC].
30. See id.; see also FOUCAULT, supra note 26, at 29.
31. See FOUCAULT, supra note 26, at 29.
32. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect.
On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around,
on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those
punished—and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and
corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over
those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives.
This is the historical reality of this soul, which, unlike the soul represented
by Christian theology, is not born in sin and subject to punishment, but is
born rather out of methods of punishment, supervision and constraint.
Id.
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conduct.33 The human mind developed guillotines, gallows, garrotes,
guns, grammar, golf, and Geneva Conventions.34 The various sys-
tems of discipline, both stark and insidious, for better or worse,
manipulate human bodies to conform and for human minds to want
to conform.35 Like all things Foucault, this was not a metaphysical
claim about the essential nature of humans.36 It is a description of
how the classical world developed sets of instructions and disci-
plines that work to control the human population.37 Through this
inversion of conventional wisdom, Foucault recognized that mass,
systemic physiological manipulation of the human mental process
has been under way for centuries.38 Although Foucault posited a
dualist notion of the soul as a non-corporeal entity, he also recognized
that these processes were physical in nature, or rather that they had
physical consequences, and were not merely ethereal concepts of
mental manipulation.39
Foucault did not recognize or have access to the more in-depth
explanations developed by neuroscience over the past several decades
that affirm his genealogical explanations about how we learn, can be
controlled, and form habits.40 Scientists have developed detailed,
though incomplete, biological and chemical explanations of physical
operations of the brain that give rise to mental phenomena.41 This is
not to say that neuroscience has all the answers, and there are
many normative issues that simply cannot be solved using descriptive
33. Id. at 30.
34. For other notable human inventions, see Evan Andrews, 11 Innovations That
Changed History, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/news/11-innovations-that-changed
-history [https://perma.cc/5RAT-XJJF] (last updated Aug. 29, 2019).
35. See FOUCAULT, supra note 26, at 137–38.
36. Foucault expressly rejected the notion that humans have an essential nature.
NOAM CHOMSKY & MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE CHOMSKY-FOUCAULT DEBATE: ON HUMAN
NATURE 5–7 (2006).
37. See FOUCAULT, supra note 26, at 137–38.
38. These methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations
of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed
upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called “disciplines”. Many
disciplinary methods had long been in existence—in monasteries, armies,
workshops. But in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
the disciplines became general formulas of domination.
Id. at 137.
39. “The classical age discovered the body as object and target of power. It is easy
enough to find signs of the attention then paid to the body—to the body that is manipu-
lated, shaped, trained, which obeys, responds, becomes skillful and increases its forces.”
Id. at 136.
40. For a rather thorough and robust review of these findings and more, see ROBERT
M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR BEST AND WORST (Penguin
Press 2017).
41. See generally ERIC R. KANDEL, THE DISORDERED MIND: WHAT UNUSUAL BRAINS
TELL US ABOUT OURSELVES (2018).
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methods.42 But one thing is certain: the idea that mental processes,
at least the processes important to the law, are not physical is unsup-
ported by evidence.43 To put it more plainly, there is no mental pro-
cess that scientists have discovered that the cause of that process is
something other than physical.44 Still, there are many who argue in
favor of types of dualism, mainly where pertinent to consciousness,
the will, and determinism.45 Regardless of the science or the debates
within philosophy that continually edge toward rejecting mind-body
dualism, the United States legal system expressly, if inconsistently,
endorses dualism.46 This makes perfect sense for a system that grew
out of the cultural roots of Western Civilization.47
The Western World has widely endorsed dualism for millennia.48
The thinking human is separated conceptually from the body by the
soul, will, god, and consciousness in Western law with few excep-
tions.49 Dualism is endorsed in some form or another by Plato,
Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, and Locke.50 The Christian faith
that was key in developing the English common law that gave birth
to the U.S. legal system followed in this tradition.51 The religious
underpinnings of dualism are hard to overstate in the Abrahamic
traditions.52 The spiritual dimension of these faiths long depended
on separating the body and the soul.53 Although the U.S. Constitu-
tion was expressly written with the rejection of sanctioned religion
42. “There is no experiment, even in principle, to indicate that humans should behave
in one way or another.” Morse, supra note 25, at 79 (emphasis in original).
43. See Lawrence E. Williams et al., The Scaffolded Mind: Higher Mental Processes
are Grounded in Early Experience of the Physical World, 39 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1257,
1257 (Dec. 1. 2009).
44. See Natalie F. Banner, Mental Disorders are Not Brain Disorders, 19 J. EVALUA-
TION IN CLINICAL PRAC. 509, 510 (May 21, 2013).
45. E.g., De Cruz, supra note 3.
46. See Fox & Stein, supra note 16, at 976–80.
47. See Robinson, supra note 6.
48. See id.
49. I analyze some of these implicit exceptions below. Infra Part III.
50. See supra note 2.
51. “The eternal principles of natural religion are part of the common law; the
essential principles of revealed religion are part of the common law; so that
any person reviling, subverting or ridiculing them, may be prosecuted at
common law.” LORD CAMPBELL adds in a note: “This, I think, is the true
sense of the oft-repeated maxim, that ‘Christianity is part and parcel of the
common law of England.’ ”
A. H. Wintersteen, Christianity and the Common Law, 38 U. PA. L. REV. 273, 276 (1890);
see Yuri Stoyanov, Religious Dualism and the Abrahamic Religions, OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF THE ABRAHAMIC RELIGIONS 405, 410 (Oct. 2015).
52. Stoyanov, supra note 51, at 410.
53. J. Guyse, D.D., The Death of the Body, and Separate State of Souls, BIBLE HUB,
https://biblehub.com/sermons/auth/guyse/the_death_of_the_body_and_separate_state
_of_souls.htm [https://perma.cc/L668-SNRM].
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in mind,54 the pervasiveness of the metaphysical notion of mind-
body dualism persisted.55 While I think that the dualist position is
indefensible against a mounting pile of evidence with no evidence to
contradict, it would be a delusion to think that the position is going
to be abandoned overnight. It has been and continues to be a corner-
stone of Western jurisprudence and, maybe more importantly, the
cultural and historical roots of Western Civilization.56 Setting aside
whether such a paradigm shift is possible, desirable, or the correct
position, I turn to the issue at hand: how would rejecting dualism
impact the U.S. legal system?
II. AREAS WHERE THE LAW ALREADY REJECTS DUALISM
A. Standards Relating to Relevant Evidence
1. In General
Federal evidence rules, which have been mostly adopted by the
states as either a matter of statute or constitutional mandate handed
down from the Supreme Court, do not allow for evidence that has no
objective foundation to enter into the record for consideration.57 For
instance, people who have no observable contact or provable exper-
tise with the matters at hand or the defendant cannot testify at trial.58
Only people with actual knowledge that is relevant to the issue at
hand are allowed to testify.59 This includes laypersons with personal
knowledge of the persons involved or the facts at issue.60 While
experts are allowed to testify upon certification by the court, they
54. Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man
& his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship,
that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not
opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should “make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between Church & State.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptists (Jan 1. 1802), 57 LIBR. OF CONG.
INFO. BULL. (June 1998). See also Thomas Jefferson, Whether Christianity Is Part of the
Common Law?, in REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE GENERAL COURT OF VIRGINIA
FROM 1730, TO 1740; AND FROM 1768, TO 1772 (1829), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 459, 463 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904–1905).
55. See Fox & Stein, supra note 16, at 978–79.
56. Id.
57. David L. Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations
on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661,
664–65 (2000).
58. FED. R. EVID. 602, 702; see also FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s notes;
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes.
59. Id.
60. FED. R. EVID. 602.
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are allowed to testify only as to the objective aspects—science, meth-
odology, etc.—of the relevant facts.61 Laypersons, when giving allow-
able testimony about a defendant’s character for example, are
allowed to testify to their personal understanding of the character of
the person on trial and to the person’s reputation in the community.62
The individual’s subjective understanding of the individual in ques-
tion is admissible as evidence only after laying a foundation that
shows that the witness has interacted with the person whose charac-
ter is being questioned at trial in the past.63 A witness who had no
past dealings with a person and just thought that someone looked like
the type of person who was trustworthy, prone to violence, etc. should
not be allowed to testify as to a person’s character.64 However, a per-
son may testify to the character of another based on their reputation
in a community if the reputation is known through experience.65
How does this bear on the question of mind-body dualism? It il-
lustrates that in evidentiary standards, non-observable, merely mental
phenomena are not allowed. For instance, forming an opinion about
a person based solely around concepts regarding that person’s iden-
tity has been rejected in regard to evidence standards.66 “Tall people
aren’t trustworthy” is a conceptual belief that might underpin the
belief that “Tyler, a particular tall person, is not trustworthy.” This is
an operation that is grounded not based upon some physical charac-
teristic or “in fact” experience that someone has, it is an operation
merely of concepts. While people can testify to their subjective impres-
sions on certain topics, if someone gives testimony that depends
upon witnessing a particular event but that person is later shown
to not have been there or actually to have no observable knowledge
of the event, their testimony should be stricken from the record, could
give rise to a mistrial,67 and the person could possibly be charged
with perjury for testifying to the truth of any matter the person does
not believe to be true.68
61. FED. R. EVID. 703. (“An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that
the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular
field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the
subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data
would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the
jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.”).
62. See FED. R. EVID. 405, 701.
63. Id.
64. See FED. R. EVID. 405. See also 701 advisory committee’s notes.
65. See FED. R. EVID. 405. See also 19 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 369 (2019).
66. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
67. See, e.g., State v. Everybodytalksabout, 39 P.3d 294, 297 (Wash. 2002).
68. False testimony must be given willfully to fulfill perjury mens rea requirements.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1621 (1994).
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Further, expert witnesses cannot testify to unknowable, other
worldly phenomenon, like to the status of a person’s soul or whether
they have achieved the required merits necessary to get into heaven.69
On the other hand, a clergyperson could testify to the standards and
doctrine within their faith.70 For example, if it is relevant whether
someone needs to attend a particular seminary to don the cloth of a
particular faith, a seasoned clergyperson of that faith would be a
fitting person to give expert testimony.71 That particular require-
ment to become a clergyperson is objective, and the clergyperson
would know based on their occupation and experience.72 Further-
more, imagine that the question in a civil trial is whether or not
someone who was denied a position in the clergy was illegally dis-
criminated against due to their race. Imagine further that the stan-
dards for becoming a clergyperson of that particular faith included
the following: “[t]he candidate must display that their soul is healthy
and has reached a level of enlightenment as determined by the su-
perior clergyperson.” Now, you have “superior clergyperson” on the
stand and ask them “in your opinion, had the plaintiff reached the
required level of enlightenment?” Their answer is allowed in as rele-
vant evidence because whether the clergyperson holds a particular
opinion is a matter of objective fact and is relevant to the issue of
whether the person met the requirements.73 Of course, it is rather easy
for someone to lie about such a fact, but it is an objective fact, none-
theless, whether the superior clergyperson is of a particular opinion
about someone’s soul.74 You could not ask the clergyperson if the
plaintiff had, as a matter of fact, a healthy soul or had, as a matter
of fact, reached the required level of enlightenment.75 In addition to
being irrelevant, the opposing counsel should object on the grounds
that it is merely speculation and that the clergyperson lacks per-
sonal knowledge.76 Whatever their level of expertise in the clergy,
no person has access to that sort of information, and it will not be
allowed in court.77 Courts do not accept evidence that is not possibly
knowable as an objective matter.78 Whether an individual holds an
opinion is this type of knowable objective matter.79
69. See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703.
70. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes.
74. Id.
75. See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703.
76. The question is also improper as it is character evidence barred by evidence rules
with some exceptions. See FED. R. EVID. 404, 405, 602, 702, 703.
77. See FED. R. EVID. 702, 703.
78. Id.
79. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s notes.
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Courts also do not accept pseudoscientific testimony when it
comes to fact-based inquisition.80 The schools of objective science pro-
pound theories that can be falsified, proven, disproven, tested, and
questioned.81 That is to say that they could possibly be shown to be
false.82 Pseudosciences, while sometimes useful, are, by definition, not
falsifiable or testable.83 Astrology, for example, could never be proven
to be false.84 At the same time, all of the phenomenon relating to a
human’s life path and tendencies can possibly be explained using
astrological methods.85 Those methods could never be argued to lead
to what is false or true.86 The explanations of astrology apply a some-
what consistent set of post-hoc explanations that plausibly relate
physical phenomenon with extra-terrestrial alignment and position-
ing.87 This sort of pseudoscience has no place in the U.S. court system.
Pseudoscience and divine explanations of events and people
might feel as though they “have some truth to them.”88 And they very
well may. But this is not the sort of truth that makes up the facts in
court that are triable as a matter of law.89 The type of truth that the
court allows is of the sort that could be proven to be false.90 If some-
thing true can be proven to be false, it has a truth value of either 1 or
0.91 If something could always be reasoned to be true and never possi-
bly proven false, it has a truth value of 1, and therefore has no proba-
tive value as to whether a particular event actually happened.92 The
80. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993).
81. See Martyn Shuttleworth & Lyndsay T. Wilson, Karl Popper’s Basic Scientific
Principle, EXPLORABLE (Sept. 21, 2008), https://explorable.com/falsifiability [https://perma
.cc/9NCM-SM68].
82. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993); see also
Shuttleworth & Wilson, supra note 81.
83. See Criterion of Falsifiability, ENCYC. BRITTANICA (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.bri
tannica.com/topic/criterion-of-falsifiability [https://perma.cc/U3US-H4S4].
84. Id.
85. Julie Beck, The New Age of Astrology, ATLANTIC (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.the
atlantic.com/health/archive/2018/01/the-new-age-of-astrology/550034 [https://perma.cc
/HX2R-LJRK].
86. See Doron Menashe, Is Judicial Proof of Facts a Form of Scientific Explanation?
A Preliminary Investigation of Clinical Legal Method, 12 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 32,
38–39 (2008).
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., Paul R. Thagard, Why Astrology Is a Pseudoscience, 1 PHIL. SCI. ASS’N
223, 225–26 (1978).
89. See Menashe, supra note 86.
90. See D. H. Kaye, On “Falsification” and “Falsifiability”: The First Daubert Factor
and the Philosophy of Science, 45 JURIMETRICS 473, 480?(2005).
91. See Types of Statements: Some Useful Definitions, LOY. UNIV., http://people.loy
no.edu/~folse/typesofstatements.html [https://perma.cc/BBP5-W9DP]; see also Vern R.
Walker, A Default-Logic Paradigm for Legal Fact-Finding, 47 JURIMETRICS 193, 209 (2007).
92. Id.
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scientific method renders conclusions that can be verified, tested, and
questioned.93 Where it does not, no conclusion should be reached.94
In the realm of evidence, U.S. law has rejected the notion that
there is something other than the physical, observable world for pur-
poses of trial.95 Even the oath taken by witnesses to tell the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth is meant to “impress that duty
on the witness’s conscience.”96 In other words, the person needs to
actually know the seriousness of their truthful testimony.97 Whether
anyone but that person can actually know such a fact is beside the
point. The point of evidence law is to introduce possibly knowable
phenomena into the record in a way that aids the trier of fact in un-
derstanding the case.98 Since dualism necessarily posits the mind as
outside the realm of physical or knowable observation,99 evidence
law has de facto rejected it.
2. Insanity Defense
The insanity defense is properly invoked where a person has no
ability to recognize the weight of their actions and is an area where
the law implies a physicalist approach to the mind, particularly
through the evidentiary demands of proving it.100 Though it can be
invoked for any crime, the focus here will be on murder. While there
are slightly different variations in the law depending on jurisdiction,
the insanity defense is a complete defense to murder and voids culpa-
bility.101 After John Hinckley attempted to kill President Reagan,
shooting him and three others, he successfully proved that he was
insane by, among other things, introducing a CT scan that showed his
brain was abnormal in a way that made him susceptible to schizophre-
nia.102 In the fallout from this high profile case and the Supreme
93. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
94. Hanne Andersen & Brian Hepburn, Scientific Method, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL.
(Nov. 13, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-method/#SciMetCouRoo [https://
perma.cc/SX7S-E88D].
95. See FED. R. EVID. 701(a), 702, 703, 901.
96. See FED. R. EVID. 603.
97. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 4 HANDBOOK OF FED. EVIDENCE § 603:1 (8th ed. 2018).
98. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
99. See Descartes, supra note 2.
100. See Insanity, 2 CRIM. L. DEF. § 173 (2019).
101. Id.
102. See Laura A. Kiernan, Hinckley Judge Reverses Himself, Admits Pictures of Defen-
dant’s Brain, WASH. POST (June 2, 1982), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/poli
tics/1982/06/02/hinckley-judge-reverses-himself-admits-pictures-of-defendants-brain/3be
c96a2-ceab-4ac9-a73e-5aff2febb3b5 [https://perma.cc/MUU9-3W57]; Natalie Jacewicz,
After Hinckley, States Tightened Use of the Insanity Plea, NPR (July 28, 2016, 10:20 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/07/28/486607183/after-hinck ley-states
-tightened-use-of-the-insanity-plea [https://perma.cc/C2SR-UGYX].
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Court’s decision in Jones v. United States,103 dozens of states changed
their standards for insanity cases to make it more difficult to prove.104
Physical evidence of mental states and disease pathology is given
substantial weight in court.105 Functional Magnetic Radiation Imag-
ing (fMRI) has been used to prove mental states, even in murder trial
sentencing,106 though there are doubts surrounding how reliably this
evidence is interpreted or understood by jurors or judges.107 A con-
cern is that the lack of data about base rates in the population and
lack of control groups to compare defendants to will cause juries, who
are typically not very scientifically savvy, to place too much weight
on scientific methods and analysis.108 While some methods are more
dubious than others, states consistently demand objective standards
for proving insanity defenses.109 The particular legal tests, though
varied, uniformly demand psychiatric evaluations and expert testi-
mony showing that the person’s condition is or was, at the time of
the crime, manifest through objective evidence.110 There is good reason
for this. The mental processes that matter in the law are the ones that
can be tested or observed objectively.111 These processes are ex-
pressed as “memory, attention, processing speed, reasoning, judg-
ment, . . . problem-solving, spatial, and language functions.”112 While
issues persist in getting the correct formula for how to qualify wit-
nesses, the testimony they will give, and how juries will understand
the information that experts relay,113 the heart of evidence law is to
103. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1984) (holding that a criminal defendant
who proves insanity may be held without violating due process until the defendant regains
sanity or is not a danger to themselves or society).
104. See Jacewicz, supra note 102.
105. See Corey Hill Allen & Eyal Aharoni, Brain Scan Evidence in Criminal Sentencing:
A Blessing and a Curse, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 2, 2019, 6:40 AM), https://theconversa
tion.com/brain-scan-evidence-in-criminal-sentencing-a-blessing-and-a-curse-113088
[https://perma.cc/H6D9-S6JZ].
106. See Greg Miller, fMRI Evidence Used in Murder Sentencing, SCIENCE (Nov. 23,
2009, 5:45 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2009/11/fmri-evidence-used-murder
-sentencing [https://perma.cc/K2FF-DM4Z].
107. See Emily R. Murphy & Teneille R. Brown, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional
Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1119, 1181–93 (2010).
108. Id. at 1179–80.
109. See, e.g., Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 295 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
“Pennsylvania case law now establishes that, to prove diminished capacity, only expert
testimony on how the mental disorder affected the cognitive functions necessary to form
the specific intent is relevant and admissible”).
110. See generally AAPL Practice Guidelines for Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of
Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S8,
S21–22, S30, S32 (Nov. 2014).
111. See id.
112. Philip D. Harvey, Clinical Applications of Neuropsychological Assessment, 14
DIALOGUES IN CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 91, 91 (2012).
113. See David Faigman et al., Gatekeeping Science: Using the Structure of Scientific
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get to the truth in a way that is reliable and testable, and proving
insanity defenses further shows this.114
Lay witnesses may testify to behavior that matches the behavior
of someone who is legally insane, but they may not testify as to
whether, in their non-expert opinion the behavior is of the type that
qualifies as “insane.”115 While posing the question, “did you think
that the defendant was able to perceive the wrongness of their ac-
tions?” to a layperson with personal knowledge about a defendant is
allowable,116 asking “do you think that the defendant was suffering
from a manifestation of [debilitating disease]” is not, because layper-
sons have no special training to identify the objective signs of partic-
ular diseases and pathologies.117 A person is going to have a hard time
proving insanity unless substantial objective evidence indicates it.118
Further, criminal evidence rules do not allow for priests, fortune
tellers, or metaphysicians to sit as expert witnesses to opine on the
presence or absence of insanity when there is no observable, physical
evidence available.119 Physical manifestations of brain disorders are
reliably detectable by trained professionals who practice science.120
Physical acts may be observed by lay persons as evidence.121 People
who are experts on mental states and laypeople who actually wit-
nessed “insane” behavior are allowed to testify, but not in the same ca-
pacity.122 People who specialize in the notions outside of the observable
realm are not allowed to testify to pseudoscientific or divine under-
standings.123 Whether the standards are correct—and at the very
least—this practice is an implicit rejection of dualist notions of the
mind and body.
B. Voluntary Manslaughter
This is an area of the law where the line between the mental
and physical is substantially blurred. Manslaughter can be invoked
Research to Distinguish Between Admissibility and Weight in Expert Testimony, 110 NW.
U. L. REV. 859, 862–63 (2016).
114. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
115. See FED. R. EVID. 701; see also FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s notes on
2000 amendments.
116. Id.
117. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
118. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 17 (1986).
119. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993); see also supra note 69.
120. The “biological approach to the mind” is detailed and developed using the neuro-
pathology of mental disorders in a recent book by Nobel Prize winning neuropsychologist,
Eric Kandel. See KANDEL, supra note 41, at 4.
121. See Insanity, supra note 100.
122. Id.
123. See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 151; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–90; see also supra
note 69.
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as a defense to murder where an intentional homicide is provoked
by something that has “the natural tendency . . . to produce . . . a
state of mind . . . with the [same] certainty that physical effects fol-
low from physical causes.”124 Federal law defines manslaughter as
“unlawful killing of a human being without malice . . . [u]pon a
sudden quarrel or heat of passion.”125
This principle dates back centuries.126 While the language is
careful here to maintain the mind-body bifurcation,127 neuroscience
can explain the process that takes place when someone perceives an
upsetting situation and then acts upon that situation, without what
the law calls “forethought”, versus when the person premeditates
their decision.128 Perception of the event sets into motion physical
processes that make way for reactions, sometimes uncontrollable
overreactions.129 When a particular brain’s regions associated with
aggression are damaged through injury, overreactions can become
the norm for that person130 and are found in some notoriously violent
individuals.131 Voluntary manslaughter doctrine defines some situa-
tions as so provocative or upsetting that even “reasonable” persons—
with brain functions within the range deemed normal—are driven
to violence and do not deserve the full weight of capital punish-
ment.132 While the law does not expressly state that the process it
124. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 220 (1862) (emphasis omitted).
125. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1112 (2008).
126. Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale,
73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 421–22 (1982).
127. [A] homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is
reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation
or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s
situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(b) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis
added).
128. SAPOLSKY, supra note 40, at 54. See generally J. Peters et al., Induction of Fear
Extinction with Hippocampal-Infralimbic BDNF, 328 SCIENCE 1288 (2010).
129. See SAPOLSKY, supra note 40, at 31.
130. See JOHN M. HARLOW, Recovery, in PASSAGE OF AN IRON BAR THROUGH THE HEAD
1, 13–14 (1869) (Employers “regarded him as the most efficient and capable foreman . . .
considered the change in his mind so marked that they could not give him his place
again . . . . He is fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity (which was
not previously his custom), manifesting but little deference for his fellows, impatient of
restraint or advice when it conflicts with his desires . . . . A child in his intellectual
capacity and manifestations, he has the animal passions of a strong man . . . . [H]is mind
was radically changed, so decidedly that his friends and acquaintances said he was ‘no
longer Gage.’ ”).
131. See Constance Holden, Fuss Over a Terrorist’s Brain, 298 SCIENCE 1551, 1551
(2002).
132. “An unlawful killing without adequate provocation is murder; but if the defen-
dant killed under provocation so serious as to produce that response in a reasonable person,
the crime will ordinarily be manslaughter.” 1 Witkin, CAL. CRIM. L. 4TH § 231(1) (2019).
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allows for is physical, it is.133 The perception of some event causes
manifest, physical changes in the brain that the person who com-
mits the killing are purported to not be able to control.134 If a person
who was able to stop and control them went ahead and killed the
person anyway, they would be guilty of premeditated murder, not
manslaughter.135 The law accounts for this process that is observed
to be, and is in fact, physical even where it is described as mental.136
The mental aspect of the description of manslaughter adds little
value. There would be no substantial difference if the law said that
the acts that can provoke a manslaughter-type killing must be of the
sort that give rise to impulse-driven neurotransmission that pro-
duces uncontrollable rage.137 There is little debate that the sort of
impulsivity accounted for by manslaughter doctrine, especially as
reaction to fear or grave offense, involves a neural process originating
in a part of the brain where we lack control.138
There is still plenty of mystery why some people within the neu-
rocognitive range deemed normal will, for example, kill their spouse
after catching them cheating while others do not.139 Most people will
get upset, but not commit the killing. Does this mean that they have
more self-control? Maybe for some, but it seems more likely that a
panoply of factors weighs on whether someone commits a man-
slaughter killing when faced with a potentially manslaughter-invok-
ing situation.140 The person who commits voluntary manslaughter
has a momentary, justified diminished capacity to control their ac-
tions because physical impulses are driving their actions.141 Even
though their killings are treated as partially justified as a result of
the “natural” state of mind, they are far from the norm.142 It is
possible that understanding both the impulsive reactions and the
controlled reactions as manifesting from different physical processes
would help sort out this confusing and somewhat inconsistent
application of the law.
133. See SAPOLSKY, supra note 40, at 31.
134. Id. at 31–33.
135. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2, 210.3 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft
1962).
136. Id.
137. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
138. See SAPOLSKY, supra note 40, at 31–33.
139. See Stanton E. Samenow, Are We All Susceptible to Crimes of Passion?, PSYCHOL.
TODAY (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/inside-the-criminal
-mind/201408/are-we-all-susceptible-crimes-passion [https://perma.cc/XB4V-Q7CU].
140. Id.
141. See SAPOLSKY, supra note 40, at 31–33.
142. See Samenow, supra note 139.
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C. Unprotected Speech
There are several types of speech that are not protected under
First Amendment doctrine.143
In this section, I discuss the types of speech that are not pro-
tected, specifically because they are considered to constitute actions,
not merely expressions of ideas or mental states.144 There are other
areas where free speech may be curtailed by the government, such
as those involving sexual obscenity and commercial speech,145 that are
not discussed. It is sufficient here to point out the speech that consti-
tutes action to show that dualism has been rejected in these areas.
Some statements are criminal acts themselves.146 Imagine some-
one tells you to go to the woods tomorrow at noon to get $100; so you
go to the woods to get the money. Instead, you get murdered by a
friend of the person who told you to go to the woods. The person who
told you to go did so knowing you would be murdered. The two peo-
ple planned the murder. The person who told you to go to the woods
did not commit the murder, but that person is guilty of murder
through accomplice liability.147 Although the person did nothing
more than speak, the person is still a murderer.148 Even if you did
not get murdered because there had been a detective who was on to
the culprits and nabbed them as they met up to plan the attack
hours before meeting you for the murder, they could still be con-
victed of conspiracy to commit murder.149 Just telling you to meet in
the woods is enough to constitute an “overt act” towards committing
a murder that is sufficient for a conspiracy conviction.150 Other ex-
amples of statements that can give rise to criminal charges on their
own include perjury and those that make up an element of larceny
by trick or fraud.151 Perjury is further discussed in Part III. Gener-
ally, material misrepresentations are not protected speech and are
actionable under criminal, tort, contract, and administrative law,
among other areas.152
143. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50 (1919).
144. See Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
145. See Iona Sharma & Sicheng Zhou, Obscenity and the First Amendment, CORNELL
U. L. SCH., https://courses2.cit.cornell.edu/sociallaw/student_projects/ObscenityFirst Amend
ment.htm [http://perma.cc/C9F7-4X4T] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 373 (1994).
147. See, e.g., Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 185 (2009).
148. Id.
149. See Conspiracy, infra note 213.
150. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (1994).
151. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1621 (1994).
152. See Fraudulent Misrepresentation, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell
.edu/wex/fraudulent_misrepresentation [http://perma.cc/N5TW-CAXR] (last visited
Nov. 4, 2019).
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Some other statements, that are not protected, must be accom-
panied by actions or potential actions of other people.153 Fighting
words,154 incitement of imminent lawlessness,155 and true threats156
are not, on their own, unprotected speech.157 But where they present
actual and imminent threats of violence or other definable harms, they
can lead to criminal charges.158 The classic example by Justice Holmes
of shouting fire in a crowded theater159 displays the logic behind these
unprotected categories. If someone yells fire in a theater, the “natu-
ral” response is to cause the people in the theater to rush out, tram-
pling each other, leading to personal injuries and possible death.160
That type of speech leading to arrest is contingent upon specific cir-
cumstances.161 Yelling fire in your bedroom on the top floor of an
otherwise empty mansion leads to no harm and is, therefore, not
criminally actionable.162
Fighting words are not protected speech.163 For example, if you
yell a racial slur in someone’s face and get punched, the person that
punched you might be protected from criminal punishment in a
similar way that people who kill their spouses when they catch
them cheating could avoid a murder charge.164 While undoubtedly
speech, certain racial and otherwise offensive words themselves
constitute actions similar to the action inducing a perception that
leads to manslaughter.165 In contrast, if someone yells a politically
charged statement that could be taken as racist as opposed to direct-
ing their racist slur at a particular person, the person who made the
statement would be protected by the criminal law and have all civil
153. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
154. Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (stating that words “which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”).
155. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (describing speech that “is di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action”).
156. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining
that “ ‘[t]rue threats’ . . . encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to
a particular individual or group of individuals . . . [t]he speaker need not actually intend
to carry out the threat”).
157. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
158. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
159. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
164. See Sara J. Berman, What is Manslaughter? What Is Murder vs. Manslaughter?,
NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/homicide-murder-manslaughter-32637
-2.html [http://perma.cc/ZEV4-93GA] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
165. Id.
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remedies against anyone who punches them, because they were exer-
cising a protected speech right.166 If this seems mushy and hard to
delineate, it is. More on protected speech that causes harm follows in
Part III below on free speech and tort damages, respectively.
Another controversial category of unprotected speech is that
which provokes imminent lawless activity, where the lawless activity
is likely to happen.167 Laws quelling speech of this type have been
especially controversial, though upheld where the speech threatens
the operations of the government, particularly during wartime.168 A
more common punishment of speech under this doctrine is where
someone incites a riot or breach of the peace.169
True threats are also not protected.170 The key to a threat being
actionable is that it is made by someone able to carry it out, although
intent is not required.171 The justification for this doctrine is that
people should be protected from the fear of violence, and that threats
increase the likelihood that the violent act will be carried out.172 Peo-
ple under a true threat justifiably take actions and make plans to
avoid the outcome of the threat.173
What do these categories of speech have in common that make
them unworthy of protection? In general, they all have an effect on
people that hear them.174 Rather, they have particular effects.175 The
words do things.176 But plenty of protected speech can have profound
impacts on people.177 Another way to express what binds these cate-
gories of speech is that they manifest physically in the world. Not
only is there an incursion into the mental space of the listener, but
they result in consistent physical changes to the hearers.178 People
who hear these unprotected words have justifiable “gut” reactions
166. See Hate Speech, FIRE (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.thefire.org/issues/hate-speech
[http://perma.cc/6BQ8-TXV4].
167. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
168. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
169. Kimberly Wimbush, Inciting to Riot, 53A AM. JUR. 2D § 20 (2019).
170. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 359–60.
173. See Understanding the Stress Response, HARV. HEALTH PUB. (Mar. 2011), https://
www.health.harvard.edu/staying-healthy/understanding-the-stress-response [http://
perma.cc/JE53-V5DU].
174. See Lisa F. Barrett, When Is Speech Violent?, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/14/opinion/sunday/when-is-speech-violence.html [https://
perma.cc/588X-5G5D].
175. See id.
176. For an introduction to philosophy of language surrounding the ability of words
to constitute actions, see generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1955).
177. See Michael Hyatt, How Our Words Impact Others (July 22, 2016), https://michael
hyatt.com/how-our-words-impact-others [http://perma.cc/T4BB-JBHT].
178. See Barrett, supra note 174.
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that arise as a natural consequence from these utterances.179 While
the law does not define what is going on in this physical way, it de-
scribes a physical change in hearers that is caused by the words.180
The words do, or rather, should be expected to do something. Other
areas of speech that are protected against governmental suppression
are seen as impacting only the mental aspects of the hearers.181 How-
ever, some protected speech has profound impacts on the hearers.182
Some protected speech leads to imminent lawless action.183 Some
protected speech poses a true threat.184 Drawing the line around par-
ticular categories appears to be exceedingly arbitrary. As I discuss
in Part III, rejecting the dualist distinction present in free speech
doctrine helps to clarify the confusing justifications for curtailing
some speech and not others. The question should be “how does the
speech impact the hearer?”, not “does the speech impact the hearer?”
III. WHEN DUALISM PREVAILS: WHERE IT MATTERS AND
WHERE IT DOES NOT
A. Mens Rea
1. Categories of Blame
Law is supposed to reflect the values of society.185 Many of the
values expressed through the law have almost nothing to do with
whether or not dualism is true, even when they appear to on the sur-
face. Rejecting dualism might appear to greatly affect mens rea re-
quirements for different criminal charges, but I argue that it does
not necessarily change anything. While epistemic questions, such as
how we know whether someone in fact had a particular mental state
when committing an act, are already impacted by neuroscientific
technology and expert testimony,186 the values expressed by different
mens rea requirements that indicate different offenses do not appear
to be affected by rejecting dualism.187 It is possible that neuroscientific
179. See Hearing Hate Speech Primes the Brain For Hateful Actions, NEUROSCIENCE
NEWS (Jan. 12, 2019), https://neurosciencenews.com/neuroscience-hate-speech-10514
[http://perma.cc/4N9A-MAS3].
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 457–61 (2011).
182. See Barrett, supra note 174.
183. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
184. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring).
185. See Law and Society, BRIDGE, https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/LawSociety/essay
1.htm [http://perma.cc/267Q-ZML7] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
186. See Murphy & Brown, supra note 107, at 1188.
187. This is a different issue than whether or not someone can choose a certain mental
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methods could serve as evidence to prove a mental state, but the un-
derlying question of what mental state a person had when commit-
ting an act would remain.188 If someone kills another with malice
aforethought, whether you are a monist or a dualist does not seem
to bear, per se, on whether you think they are guilty of first degree
murder.189 Similarly, a physicalist and a dualist can both reasonably
think that someone who commits a homicide in the heat of passion
should be convicted of the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter.190
The value that is expressed has to do with the mental state of the
actor and the degree to which that person’s actions reflected that
their mind—physical or not—operated in such a way as to meet the
requisite standards.191
What about choice? Can someone choose if their body is their
mind? Wouldn’t determinism follow directly from physicalism? I will
not go too far down this rabbit hole, but some cursory comments
should suffice to delineate my project from these concerns. In general,
choice is a separate, conceptually more fundamental issue that is af-
fected substantially by the notion of dualism.192 The mind has been
conceived of throughout the Western world as somewhat of a captain,
piloting the ship of the body around its existential ocean.193 If the mind
is instead conceived of as an integral part of the body, who is the cap-
tain? Physicalist responses to these questions range from accepting
that choice is a spurious notion to denying that the concept of choice
is even related to adhering to physicalism.194 In any case, physical-
ism and choice can coexist—for the purposes of legal doctrine—even
if they are not compatible in “the final analysis.” In fact, legal doctrine
based on consequences for actions infers that choice exists.195 The
state in the first place or whether someone can be blameworthy in a physicalist world. It
seems obvious that someone’s physical brain state could be such that in one instance we
consider them to be choosing and in another instance they are not choosing. Even physical
explanations can include choosing. The values that we ascribe to those physical explana-
tions could change based on a particular view of choice, but they do not necessarily need
to change as a matter of logic or course just because we reject the notion of dualism.
188. See id.
189. See Howard J. Curtis, Malice Aforethought, In Definition of Murder, 19 YALE L.J.
639, 639 (1910).
190. See Berman, supra note 164.
191. Id.
192. See Maia Szalavitz, Making Choices: How Your Brain Decides, TIME (Sept. 4,
2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/09/04/making-choices-how-your-brain-decides
[http://perma.cc/7HC4-MGX9].
193. Id.
194. See Bill Pratt, Is Free Will Possible for the Physicalist?, TOUGH QUESTIONS
ANSWERED (Apr. 25, 2012), https://www.toughquestionsanswered.org/2012/04/25/is-free
-will-possible-for-the-physicalist [http://perma.cc/VD7B-95F3].
195. See Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea, L. SHELF, https://lawshelf.com/courseware/en
try/model-penal-codes-mens-rea [http://perma.cc/HQ46-PEEZ] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
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question of choice qua choice is a topic for those who are not dealing
with the current legal paradigm.
In sum, mens rea categories exist as valuations of particular
mental states regarding particular actions,196 and those mental
states being physical in nature do not necessarily alter their exis-
tence or weight.
2. Forming Intent
Distinct from mens rea classification is the epistemic question
of how to know, understand, and decide whether a person had the
requisite mental state that is expressed by mens rea doctrine. A key
distinction is when intent forms.197 In “Dualism and Doctrine,” Dov
Fox and Alex Stein argue that criminal mens rea requirements em-
phasizing “the defendant’s subjective mental state marks a radical
departure from the objective culpability paradigm that dominated
criminal law for centuries.”198 In contrast, the objective culpability
standard presumes intent from the proven action and places the
burden on the defendant to raise defenses, proving that they did not
have the requisite intent to be convicted of the crime.199 Under this
standard, a person who commits an act is presumed to have intended
the “ordinary consequences” of the act.200 Fox and Stein conclude
that the objective culpability standard should return, because the
“epistemic weakness” of subjective culpability leaves juries guessing
and imputing mental states onto defendants.201 They argue that the
underlying issue with the subjective mens rea standard is that it
employs a dualist notion that separates a person’s mental state from
their actions.202 Instead of treating the subject’s mental state as if
it is separate from their action, they argue that mental states are
“embedded in and realized by the conduct they drive.”203 Further, they
posit that, because the act itself is the best evidence of the intention
of the actor, that criminal intent should “be treated as fundamen-
tally different from a person’s desires, plans, and designs.”204 Under
the subjective mens rea standard, they argue that mind and body exist
as separate entities and will lead to consistent mistakes by triers of
196. See id.
197. See Fox & Stein, supra note 16, at 1005.
198. Id. at 1000 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 1000–01.
200. Id. at 1001.
201. Id. at 1002.
202. Id.
203. Fox & Stein, supra note 16, at 1003.
204. Id. at 1002.
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fact.205 While I agree with Stein and Fox that dualism is ill-equipped
to handle legal issues such as these, I do not agree with their analy-
sis about the consequences of dualistic rejection.206
First, if their desire is to increase the accuracy of triers of fact
in finding intent, forbidding juries to consider plans and designs to
prove intent will increase errors, not reduce them. By insisting the
jury presume intent from the act and nothing else, juries will have
less information available to make an initial decision.207 It stands to
reason that less information will lead to less accurate decisions.208
However, Fox and Stein argue that the additional information is
quite simply the wrong information to rely on.209 This reply both
begs the question and is a red herring that actually has nothing to
do with dualism or intent. It has to do with whether mental pro-
cesses that happen before or after the act are capable of defining the
act itself.210 Their argument seems to imply that prior mental states,
for instance, evidence of directed planning, cannot inform on whether
someone has the intention to commit an act that they do commit.211
This position is untenable.
Think back to the example of someone telling you to meet them
in the woods to get murdered. Under Fox and Stein’s view, the act
of lying to someone in preparation of someone else murdering them
the next day does not constitute a criminal act, because “a person
cannot be convicted for his desires, aspirations, or plans alone.”212 At
best, this displays a misappropriation of the normative dimensions
at play here. The fact that the person who tells you to go to the
woods could have a change of mind and not want you to be mur-
dered at the very time you are being murdered presents a disposi-
tive blow to the view propounded by Fox and Stein. That person
could be convicted of murder even though the person did not act at
all to murder and merely planned it.213 The only evidence of their
guilt in the conspiratorial murder would be preparation and plan-
ning.214 If the murder they planned takes place even after they
decided that they did not want to do it, they are still liable for the
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1002–05.
207. Id. at 1002–03.
208. Id. at 1005–06.
209. Fox & Stein, supra note 16, at 1005–06.
210. Id. at 1005.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1003.
213. See Conspiracy, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/inchoate-crimes
/conspiracy [http://perma.cc/YU99-7YQP] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
214. Id.
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murder, even though they did not have any intent to commit the
crime when it happened.215 Their intent to commit a murder is satis-
fied by their planning alone.216
There is a further issue with their view. By allowing that mental
states can only be inferred from an action, Fox and Stein actually
commit themselves to dualism.217 Specifically, they infer that the
planning that goes into a crime is a temporally displaced moment
where the mental state is apparently independent of the body.218
How can it be that only the mental state that is required for the
action in question is imbedded in the action? Did the previous men-
tal states not leave an impression on the actor up to that point? This
seems to result from a confusion about the causation of actions. A
thought you had this morning can impact your actions tonight, even
if you do not realize it.219 The idea that the prior mental state is
somehow only embedded in a person’s brain for the moment they
are thinking it, and in congress with whatever action the person is
taking at the moment, posits mental states as separate entities that
exist only for a moment and then fleetingly leave the body, as if they
never existed and are no longer bound up in future actions.220 This
is not an issue that Fox and Stein take up in their paper, so I will not
speculate as to what their response might be. But it demonstrates
confusion in their reasoning. There is another more compelling reason
to reject the view.
Finally, the view that only completing an action aligns with
mental states, and intention does not comport to evidence, is com-
pletely opposed to intuitions about actions.221 Simply put, one does
not have to complete an action to intend it.222 Actions such as mov-
ing a limb, dunking a basketball, or driving across town and mur-
dering your stepmother in your sleep,223 and mental processes such
as intending to do any of those things, though all physical in nature,
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See Fox & Stein, supra note 16, at 1003.
218. See id. at 1002.
219. See Nancy P. Rothbard, How Your Morning Mood Affects Your Whole Workday,
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 21, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/how-your-morning-mood-affects
-your-whole-workday [http://perma.cc/4HTA-UXVZ].
220. See Stevan Yalowitz, Anomalous Monism, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anomalous-monism/#MenCau [http://perma.cc/VJ5Z
-XLKY].
221. Fox & Stein, supra note 16, at 1000.
222. See The Elements of ‘Attempt’ and the Possible Penalties, BERRY L., https://jsberry
law.com/blog/attempt-to-commit-a-crime-and-the-possible-penalties [http://perma.cc
/7CAR-7S8E] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
223. See R. v. Kenneth James Parks, [1992] S.C.R. 871 (Can.).
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are distinguishable.224 Understanding that mental processes that
make up desires, plans, and intentions are physical in nature does not
mean that those things are necessarily embedded in some actions
while others are not, nor is there any safe inference to be made about
an action containing a particular mental state at all.225 For example,
think about dunking a basketball. The first time someone dunks a
basketball, it probably takes a lot of physical and mental energy to
do so. As the person dunks and dunks and dunks, the repetition
leads to less mental energy being expended as the person conditions
their body to perform the action through habit.226 Over time, dunk-
ing the ball when the situation calls for it requires little or no active
intention. We see players in sports who go through moments where
they are “clicking on all cylinders,” “unconscious,” or “in the zone.”227
This phenomenon known as “flow state” has been described in psy-
chology across cultures.228 It is an automatic process when the situa-
tion presents itself, not one in which the actor is premeditating their
actions.229 When Michael Jordan hit six three-pointers in the first
half of a game in the 1992 NBA finals, he looked over to the an-
nouncer’s table and shrugged his shoulders, turning his hands up
in the most ‘I have no idea what’s going on right now’ moment in the
history of sports.230 Jordan himself was “surprised” at how well he
shot the ball from downtown during the game, but his shooting was
“automatic” that night.231 There is little question that his mental
state aligned with his action, but did he have the type of intention we
think of when we say premeditation? I would argue that his mental
state was closer to that of someone who acts in the heat of passion,
responding automatically to perceived stimuli.232 When LeBron James
made the game-winning block on Andre Iguodala to secure the 2016
224. See supra note 195.
225. See Janet A. Young & Michelle D. Pain, The Zone: Evidence of a Universal Phe-
nomenon for Athletes Across Sports, 1 ATHLETIC INSIGHT 21, 22 (Nov. 1999).
226. See id. at 21.
227. See id. at 21–22.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 21.
230. See Aaron Dodson, On this Day in NBA Finals History: Michael Jordan’s ‘Shrug
Game,’ THE UNDEFEATED (June 3, 2017), https://theundefeated.com/features/nba-finals
-history-michael-jordan-shrug-game [https://perma.cc/ZXL9-HHEJ].
231. Id.
232. See Habit Formation, PSYCHOL. TODAY, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/ba
sics/habit-formation [http://perma.cc/7HJV-UB6Z] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). To be clear,
the best players are those with high mental capacity and cognitive ability. But their skills
are conditioned through habit, not by simply thinking their way through a particular
action. Getting to a place where certain skills that are highly cognitively demanding—
like creative passing and playmaking—are present takes conditioning a mind that has
the underlying potential to be conditioned into making those plays.
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NBA Championship, he did not stop and contemplate the necessary
steps to carry out the act.233 He just did it. This does not mean that
LeBron did not intend to block that shot. He clearly did. But his action
was automatic to the situation because of his prior intentions to
habituate himself.234 There was no deliberation in the moment. His
preparing and planning his whole life to reach that ultimate point
of blocking that shot manifested in the action that secured the vic-
tory.235 Those prior plans, habituation, and preparation are evidence
of his intention, even if he had failed to make the play.236 That sort of
evidence would be necessary to show that he had premeditated such
an action, because the actual mental state in the window of when the
play took place does not reflect such premeditation.237 LeBron’s life is
one of intention. He intends to win the NBA Championship by putting
in an insane amount of work both on and off the court outside of the
actual game.238 But he did not have the specific intent to block that
particular shot, that in fact matches purposeful mens rea, if only the
mental state at the time of the action counts.239 The act flowed directly
and automatically from the situation, the way that voluntary man-
slaughter does.240 Does this mean he should not be found guilty of, if
you will, murdering the Warriors’ title hopes?241 I think not. By trying
to separate a person’s actions from their prior mental states—desires,
plans, and preparations—Fox and Stein wind up with a temporally
displaced moment of action that confuses the concept of intention.242
Their analysis would produce—in the “correct” result—that the
flow state produces intentional actions, because they assume that
233. See Alex Myers, LeBron James’ “The Block” Turns 3, and It’s as Spectacular as
Ever, GOLF DIGEST (June 19, 2019), https://www.golfdigest.com/story/lebron-james-the
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237. See Premeditation Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL, https://definitions.usle
gal.com/p/premeditation [http://perma.cc/8Y5Q-JY9N] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). I want
to be clear that this analysis does not mean that the brain is not working during such
an action. It is, and at a high level. It is just not actively contemplating and deliberating
actions in the way that the law defines premeditation.
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the mental state that is required can be inferred directly from the
action.243 However, the correctness of their analysis would be based
on a presumption that is not always true and would produce consis-
tent errors. These errors are evidence that undermine the founda-
tional principle of assumed innocence and guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.244 If you presume someone who has committed an action has
the required mens rea, then it is foisted upon the defendant to pro-
duce reasonable doubt and bear the burden of persuasion.245 This is
a reversal of the underpinnings of legal protections for criminal de-
fendants.246 Ultimately, I do not think dualism necessarily bears on
intention or how we think about mens rea in a significant way as
pertaining to the values that the current doctrine describes. Plans,
preparations, and desires can all be understood as physical while also
being understood as important epistemic tools for knowing whether
intent exists.247
B. Mental Versus Physical Tort Damages
Tort law damages doctrine maintains a stark distinction between
mental and physical harms.248 In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court
of the United States set aside a jury verdict awarding damages to a
grieving father against the Westboro Baptist Church because mem-
bers of the church hurled deeply hurtful insults and displayed offen-
sive, malicious signs toward the family as they attended the funeral
of the son, who was a Marine killed in the Iraq War.249 Throughout
the opinion and dissent, the court refers to the emotional injuries
suffered by the plaintiff, but at no point does the court entertain the
notion that those injuries could be physical in nature.250 The Su-
preme Court upheld the lower court’s vacation of the jury award on
First Amendment grounds, stating “that any distress occasioned by
Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the
message conveyed.”251 If the signs had been friendly and the message
was one of love, the Court reasoned, there would have been no grounds
for liability.252 The Court held that even speech that “inflict[s] great
243. Id. at 980.
244. Id. at 1001.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See Premeditation Law and Legal Definition, supra note 237.
248. See Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Distress Torts, L. SHELF, https://lawshelf
.com/videos/entry/emotional-distress-torts [http://perma.cc/U7QA-RU4U] (last visited
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252. Id. at 449–57.
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pain” will not subject the speaker to liability when it is spoken on a
matter of public importance, because to do so would be to punish the
speaker, and that violates the First Amendment.253 What would the
Court have held if they had analyzed the harm to the father as a
physical harm exacted upon his already vulnerable brain due to the
tragic death of his son? Could the plaintiff use expert testimony to
prove that the harm was physical and not “merely” mental?
In Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley, the Court held
that physical contact with a substance known to cause cancer does not
provide sufficient grounds to recover for emotional distress caused
by the fear of potentially getting cancer.254 Even Justice Ginsburg’s
dissenting opinion in Buckley, which would allow for recovery in such
a circumstance, does not characterize the psychological harms as
physical, although the opinion states that it can be shown through
objective evidence that the emotional harm exists.255 Would that case
have come out differently if the harm was seen as emanating from
physical causes in and involving the physical body?
Outside of tort damages, the Social Security Act defines physical
and mental impairments separately, referring to psychiatrists/psychol-
ogists to determine mental impairments and physicians to deter-
mine physical impairments.256 Would this change if dualism was
rejected? In each of these cases, I doubt that the values involved would
be changed much, if at all, but the arguments in favor of awarding
damages to plaintiffs whose injuries are merely mental could change.
Namely, plaintiff’s attorneys could potentially argue and prove that
the harms are physical using expert testimony.
The harms classified as mental in tort law are now known to have
some physical characteristics in the brain where and when they do, in
fact, exist.257 Many of these phenomena can be observed.258 However,
up until the latter half of the twentieth century, psychiatric—mental—
disorders were viewed as fundamentally different than neurological
disorders.259 “Because psychiatric and addictive disorders did not
produce obvious damage in the brain” that could be seen during au-
topsy, these disorders were understood as “under the individual’s
control.”260 On the other hand, neurological disorders were classified
as physical impairments that altered the ability of the individual to
253. Id. at 460–61.
254. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 427–30 (1997) (Ginsburg,
J. concurring in part).
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control their actions.261 Today, there is increasingly wide belief that
there is no essential difference in psychiatric and neurological dis-
orders, and that they all stem from physical substrates.262
The current status of the law is generally informed by the older
view of psychiatric and neurological bifurcation, and seems to turn
on whether the source of the harm can be readily, obviously identified
by the trier of fact.263 For instance, if someone’s personality changes
due to a blunt force trauma to the head, that blunt force trauma and
the physical impact on the mind informs the trier of fact where the
harm came from.264 Blunt force trauma to the head that causes such
harm also often results in permanent damage, so there is often little
that can be done to correct the personality changes.265 In contrast,
if someone becomes depressed after being abusively accosted during
their son’s funeral, the source of that harm is more in doubt. The
abusive speech contributes to the anguish felt by the father, and it
might meet the standard for proximate cause given the right argu-
ment.266 But there are various causes of developing suicidal
thoughts in such a situation.267 “Our individual experiences and be-
havior are rooted in the interaction of genes and environment that
shapes our brains.”268 Because of the various contributing factors,
proving causation in tort law is still going to pose a difficult task for
plaintiffs with mental harms, even if they can be couched in a phys-
ical framework.269
Another reason that the values in the current bifurcated
scheme make sense is that many mental harms are surmountable
in ways that something like traumatic brain injury is not.270 Cata-
strophic structural injury to the brain is often permanent, if not
degenerative.271 On the other hand, depression, anxiety, addiction,
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265. See Helen M. Bramlett & W. Dalton Dietrich, Long-Term Consequences of Trau-
matic Brain Injury: Current Status of Potential Mechanisms of Injury and Neurological
Outcomes, 32 J. NEUROTRAUMA 1834, 1834 (2015).
266. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 312 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
267. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 445 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
268. KANDEL, supra note 41, at 31.
269. See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm,
90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 838 (2007).
270. See J. Stanley McQuade, The Eggshell Skull Rule and Related Problems in Re-
covery for Mental Harm in the Law of Torts, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 35 (2001).
271. See Traumatic Brain Injury, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases
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post-traumatic stress disorder, etc. are most often treatable through
cognitive behavioral therapy, medication, and other more traditional
means such as exercise, meditation, and finding a job that is fulfil-
ling.272 Most people recover from “merely” mental harms caused by
a traumatic event.273 While all of these conditions can be observed and
described as physical in nature, they are significantly different than
a traumatic brain injury.274 The plasticity of undamaged structural
regions of the brain associated with emotional well-being, along with
the manipulability of the associated processes by pharmaceutical in-
tervention, gives hope that psychological harms associated with verbal
abuse or witnessing and taking on the burden of traumatic events can
be overcome.275 The dualistic distinction in tort law seems to clum-
sily reflect this reality.
In practice, plaintiffs’ attorneys who are faced with a limit or
bar on merely mental damages can potentially make a compelling
argument that none of the traditional mental harms are merely men-
tal.276 If it can be shown that such harms are physical—for example
that depression has physical causation whether or not the primary
or original source is identifiable—and that the physical pathology
of it is quite readily observable through neuroscientific methods, the
bar on mental damage recoveries could be broken.277 However, it
seems likely that courts would determine this to be a semantic point,
and that the countervailing reasons for not allowing mental damages,
namely the provability and recoverability factors discussed above,
prevail and the precedent holds. But this is clearly speculation on
my part. In Section III.D below, I develop a specific type of harm that
is considered to be merely mental that should, for superseding rea-
sons, give rise to a fundamental protection under the First Amend-
ment. However, for ordinary tort damages, the case is out on whether
the law should change its consideration of mental and physical
-conditions/traumatic-brain-injury/symptoms-causes/syc-20378557 [https://perma.cc
/P9NB-VSFH].
272. See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN
ANCIENT WISDOM 90–92 (2006).
273. See Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, NAT’L INST. HEALTH & MED., https://www
.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/post-traumatic-stress-disorder-ptsd/index.shtml [https://
perma.cc/JE99-JD72] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
274. See Theodore A. Henderson, TBI and PTSD Appear Similar But Treatments Must
Differ, BEHAVIORAL (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.psychcongress.com/article/tbi-and-ptsd
-appear-similar-treatments-must-differ [https://perma.cc/RG5H-F6TL].
275. See Zoe Reyes, The Roles Neuroplasticity and EMDR Play in Healing from Child-
hood Trauma, PSYCHCENTRAL (Oct. 8, 2018), https://psychcentral.com/lib/the-roles-neuro
plasticity-and-emdr-play-in-healing-from-childhood-trauma [https://perma.cc/G6E9-K44C].
276. See Candice E. Renka, The Presumed Eggshell Plaintiff Rule: Determining Lia-
bility When Mental Harm Accompanies Physical Injury, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 289,
310–11 (2007).
277. Id.
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harms.278 Abolishing the dualistic notions that underpin the lan-
guage of the law does not logically entail that the categories of physical
and mental harms themselves should be wiped off the books.
C. Testimonial Versus Bodily Evidence
The fundamental question in this section is “if they are both
physical, is there a difference between testimonial evidence and
evidence derived from a person’s body through empirical observa-
tion?” In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court held that, while
compulsion of testimonial evidence found in the mind is not allowed
under the Fifth Amendment, “real or physical evidence” may be comp-
elled from the body, including blood.279 This is another issue Fox and
Stein take issue with stating “the doctrinal distinction between
testimonial and physical evidence . . . collapses like the dualist
divide of mind and body that it presupposes.”280 They reason that
“compelling a suspect’s self-incriminating words and gestures sub-
jects him to no more painful a decision than the compulsion of his
bodily samples or markings.”281 I disagree with their reasoning.
Just because two things are physical does not mean that the val-
ues involved are identical. This is especially true when it comes to
testimonial evidence and the justifications against compelling self-
incrimination.282 As Justice Brennan explained in the plurality opinion
in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination “reflects our fierce unwillingness to subject those sus-
pected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or
contempt.”283 Fox and Stein claim “nothing in this ‘cruel trilemma’
justification against subjecting suspects to agonizing choices suggests
that the right to silence should protect only testimonial but not physi-
cal evidence . . . [not only testimonial evidence] subjects a criminal
suspect to a psychologically painful decision.”284 While it is true that
deciding whether to allow samples of one’s body to be taken can be
agonizing, it is categorically different from testimonial evidence.285
Analyzing the three factors in the “cruel trilemma” should make
this clear. First, while it is possible to construe self-accusation to be
present in the compulsion of bodily evidence, the type of accusation
278. See Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 805, 806–07 (2004).
279. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760, 764 (1966).
280. Fox & Stein, supra note 16, at 998.
281. Id.
282. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972).
283. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990) (internal citations omitted).
284. Fox & Stein, supra note 16, at 997.
285. See FED. R. EVID. 701; see also FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee’s notes on
2000 amendments.
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is different.286 Bodily evidence can be taken without a normally
functioning person even knowing about it.287 Testimonial cannot.288
If someone is in a public space and a picture is taken of them that
reveals a tattoo on their chest, that picture reveals bodily evidence.289
But it was not compelled from them, and it is certainly not com-
pelled in the way testimonial evidence would be.290 A blood sample
can be taken from an unconscious person suspected of drunk driving,
and whether such a sample was derived in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is a live issue depending on specific facts.291 Whether
the sample is testimonial is not a live issue any more than whether
the blood that is found at the scene of a crime is testimonial.292 It is
not.293 The constitutional issue present in the compulsion of bodily
evidence is the degree to which the state may invade someone’s body
to collect otherwise knowable information.294
Second, perjury is not even possible when the evidence provided
is objective physical evidence, such as a DNA test.295 The results of
the test could be misleading, but there is no ability to lie about them
by the defendant.296 There is potential for the person whose bodily
evidence is being compelled to provide a sample that is not from their
body. This is fraudulent behavior, but it is not exactly the same as
committing perjury or lying using testimony.297 The issue here is one
of objective physical evidence. How to know someone gave a fake sam-
ple is much different than how to know someone gave false testi-
mony.298 One depends on the reliability of taking the proper sample,
whereas testimony relies on the person speaking honestly.299 This
is a substantial difference between testimonial and bodily evidence.
Finally, contempt can—like in the instance of refusing to
testify—be applied to those who refuse to give bodily samples in cer-
tain situations, but the ability of the government to apply penalties
for refusing to give up bodily evidence differs depending on the type
286. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000).
287. See Mitchell v. Wisconsin, No. 18-6210, slip op. at 19 (S. Ct. June 27, 2019).
288. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
289. See People v. Slavin, 807 N.E. 2d 259, 260 (N.Y. 2004).
290. Id. at 262–64.
291. People v. Arredondo, 371 P.3d 240 (Cal. 2016) (wherein the California Supreme
Court decided if the blood sample was impliedly consented to and is therefore allowed
into evidence as a reasonable search and seizure).
292. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
293. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
294. Id. at 770.
295. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1)–(2) (1994).
296. Id.
297. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1), (b)(7)(A)–(B) (2016).
298. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1)–(2) (1994).
299. Id.
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of evidence and the situation.300 For example, information about a
person’s height is far different from their DNA. In another example,
the Supreme Court recently held that, in the absence of a warrant,
criminal contempt penalties can be applied to drunk driving sus-
pects who refuse to give breath tests but not for people who refuse
blood tests, where only civil penalties are allowed.301 However, the
Court’s reasoning relied on the difference in the intrusiveness of the
test, not on whether or not the bodily evidence was testimonial.302 This
makes sense, because the interests of the government to protect people
from driving under the influence and the interests of the individual’s
privacy are what are at stake, not the interests involved in self-incri-
minating testimony.303 Blood contains a bounty of hidden information
about a person, and once it is obtained and tested, there is not much
question as to the information being conveyed, if it is in fact the defen-
dant’s blood.304 This brings up the next reason Fox and Stein’s oblitera-
tion of the testimonial/physical distinction is wrong: epistemic value.
Testimonial evidence, when compelled from a defendant, is more
likely to contain factual errors.305 This is a central reason that forced
confessions are not admissible in court: their lack of accuracy.306
This issue does not come up in bodily evidence compulsion unless
the sample is not the sample it is thought to be. There can be a mis-
take about whether the correct bodily sample is being used, but the
mistake is identifiable and correctable in a way that testimonial evi-
dence is not.307 You do not need to torture someone to get them to
admit they are a particular blood type or have a certain color hair.
You just need to take the correct samples. There is no willful act by
300. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(3); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2183–84
(2016).
301. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2183–84.
302. Id. at 2184 (“Having assessed the effect of BAC tests on privacy interests and the
need for such tests, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath
tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. The impact of breath tests on privacy is slight,
and the need for BAC testing is great. We reach a different conclusion with respect to
blood tests. Blood tests are significantly more intrusive, and their reasonableness must
be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive alternative of a breath test. Respon-
dents have offered no satisfactory justification for demanding the more intrusive alterna-
tive without a warrant.”).
303. Id. at 2178.
304. See Maura Dolan & Jason Felch, Ruling Allows ‘Rarity’ Statistic in DNA Cases,
L.A. TIMES (June 17, 2008, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008
-jun-17-me-dna17-story.html [https://perma.cc/M9EQ-8L67].
305. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991).
306. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
307. See Greg Hurley, The Trouble with Eyewitness Identification Testimony in Crimi-
nal Cases, NCSC (2017), https://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/trends/home
/Monthly-Trends-Articles/2017/The-Trouble-with-Eyewitness-Identification-Testimony
-in-Criminal-Cases.aspx [https://perma.cc/U63T-XT2N].
112 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:077
the person the sample is derived from that determines the truth or
falsity of the information if a sample does in fact come from that
person.308 Conversely, there is a willful act required that results in
the truth value of a testimonial statement.309 Bodily samples are dif-
ferent in character because they can be taken against the will of the
person giving the information and are verifiable against objective
references, such as samples found on a crime scene or derived from
surveillance footage.310 The contents of someone’s recollection or
factual representation of their involvement in some act is categori-
cally different, even if they are both physical in essence.311
D. First Amendment Free Speech Doctrine
“The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilised community, against [the person’s] will,
is to prevent harm to others.”312
1. Dualism and Protected Speech in General
The First Amendment is about protecting mental processes
against government impediment and control.313 Freedom of associa-
tion, religion, and speech and from government intervention are
concepts that entail the individual’s ability to shape the individual’s
own mind.314 In this section, the question is: “If the ideas and mech-
anisms that allow for the expression of ideas derive from physical
functions, how would the law change?” The way that mental processes
are characterized metaphysically is essential to understanding how
the processes should be protected under the law.315 If the processes of
the mind are not physical—if they exist in a non-observable dimension
308. See Breithaupt v. Abram, Warden, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).
309. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1)–(2) (1994).
310. See Jonathan Jones, Forensic Tools: What’s Reliable and What’s Not-So-Scientific,
PBS (Apr. 17, 2012), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/forensic-tools-whats-reli
able-and-whats-not-so-scientific [https://perma.cc/X6JA-4V63].
311. See Hal Arkowitz & Scott O. Lilienfeld, Why Science Tells Us Not to Rely on
Eyewitness Accounts, SCI. AM. (Jan. 1, 2010), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article
/do-the-eyes-have-it [https://perma.cc/4C84-BMUU].
312. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Batoche Books 2001) (1859).
313. See JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS, ¶ 1 (1785) (“[T]he opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated
by their own minds, cannot follow the dictates of other men.”); see also Everson v. Board of
Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (“These words of the First Amendment reflected in the minds of
early Americans a vivid mental picture of conditions and practices which they fervently
wished to stamp out in order to preserve liberty for themselves and for their posterity.”).
314. See MADISON, supra note 313, ¶ 1.
315. See Anita Bowles, Courting Research: Psychology and Law Go Hand-in-Hand,
ASS’N PSYCHOL. SCI. (Jan. 26, 2005), https://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/court
ing-research-psychology-and-law-go-hand-in-hand [https://perma.cc/3ELA-L3RD].
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so to speak—the analysis surrounding them could survive in the
current framework. But if they are physical in nature, I argue that
the analysis must change.
It is helpful to compare this issue with mens rea. As opposed to
the criminal mens rea issues discussed before, which are about the
values ascribed to various mental states at the time of another act,
the subject of First Amendment doctrine is the ‘mental’ process itself
as it is happening.316 The doctrine surrounding the First Amendment
defines how people can use that process without running into legal
troubles, and how they can and should be protected from entities, like
the government, who might wish to impose particular mental states
on them.317
Current First Amendment doctrine relies on the bifurcation of
mental and physical harms to justify protections in many areas.318 Pro-
pagandist racism,319 marketing and advertising,320 and hate speech321
broadly find refuge in the First Amendment. However, there is prece-
dent that indicates that defaming entire groups of people, such as
religious people322 or racial groups,323 can be sanctioned by state action
that restricts certain types of speech.324
Commercial speech that affects children also provides an example
of how public health can override First Amendment rights.325 For ex-
ample, tobacco advertising is restricted to certain types of mediums
due to tobacco’s addictive qualities and the effects of advertising on
enticing young people to use tobacco.326 Further, public health and
safety is commonly used as a justification for exceptions from other
316. See Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea, supra note 195.
317. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969).
318. See David S. Han, The Mechanics of First Amendment Audience Analysis, 55 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1647, 1651 (2014).
319. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445–48.
320. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980) (holding that unless a commercial advertisement is misleading or promoting un-
lawful activity that it is still afforded substantial protections from government regulation).
321. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393–94 (1992) (striking down laws that
curtailed both fighting words and protected speech as overly broad).
322. Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S., 568, 569–74 (1942) (validating that the
use of defamatory language towards entire groups, in this case those involved in orga-
nized religion, can justify criminal charges for breach of the peace under the fighting
words doctrine).
323. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251, 258–66 (1952) (upholding a law that
banned depicting “depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens
of any race, color, creed, or religion”).
324. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
325. See Nicole DiGiose, Protecting Children? The Evolution of the First Amendment:
A Historical Timeline of Children and Their Access to Pornography and Violence, 33 PACE
L. REV. 462, 466–77 (2013).
326. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
131, §§ 2(3), 2(5), 2(31) and 2(49), 123 Stat. 1776, 1777–1781 (2009).
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individual protections.327 For example, mandatory vaccinations,328
the right to not self-incriminate,329 terrorism,330 driver sobriety tests,331
and gun laws332 are all areas where public safety is invoked to promul-
gate protective policies involving fundamental rights.333 First Amend-
ment doctrine is foundational to the ability of people to exercise
their autonomy and foster discussion in the marketplace of ideas.334
This is why it is so crucial to understand when ideas restrict the
ability of someone to be autonomous, and to take part in fostering a
more just and verdant society. By understanding how the functions
of the brain are impacted in childhood, it becomes apparent that
some now-protected speech works to undermine the purpose of the
First Amendment.335 Therefore, the doctrine should be refined, speci-
fied, and reformed. While this doctrinal shift is potentially drastic,
I focus on one phenomenon in particular.
As a foil for this discussion, I analyze the practice of indoctri-
nating children with racist ideology. Certain types of racist teaching
actually cause, and can be proven to cause, physical, biological changes
that harm the listener.336 I argue that this presents a public health
327. See Ronald Bayer, The Continuing Tensions Between Individual Rights and Public
Health, 8 EMBO REP. 1099 (2007).
328. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 19 (1905) (upholding the state mandatory
vaccination law for school children).
329. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657–58, 663 (1984) (holding that the evidenti-
ary exclusionary rule does not apply when interests of public safety justify not reading
Miranda rights. The Court cites some examples of things that give rise to justifying a war-
rantless search where a gun might be present in the interests of “public safety: an accom-
plice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come upon it.” The Court
offers no definition of public safety. Concurring in judgment, Justice O’Connor expresses
concern over the vagueness of this exception. “[A] ‘public safety’ exception unnecessarily
blurs the edges of the clear line heretofore established and makes Miranda’s requirements
more difficult to understand.”).
330. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783, 793–95 (2008) (denying federal courts
jurisdiction over Habeas Corpus actions involving “enemy combatants” who pose a threat
to national security).
331. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016) (upholding implied
consent laws that mandate drivers to submit to breathalyzers under the threat of
criminal sanctions, while also striking down implied consent laws that impose criminal
sanctions for refusing a blood draw).
332. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (upholding a ban of unlicensed
sawed-off shotguns under the National Firearms Act, reasoning that possession of such
weapons was a threat to public safety and not reasonably related to ensuring a well-
regulated militia).
333. See Bayer, supra note 327, at 1099.
334. See Brian Miller, There’s No Need To Compel Speech. The Marketplace of Ideas
Is Working, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2017, 3:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/briankmiller
/2017/12/04/theres-no-need-to-compel-speech-the-marketplace-of-ideas-is-working/#728e2
a254e68 [https://perma.cc/7524-NPND].
335. See Jedediah Britton-Purdy, The Bosses’ Constitution, THE NATION (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-bosses-constitution [https://perma.cc/VST6-AMRA].
336. See Barrett, supra note 174.
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crisis, and understanding the problem as a physiological condition-
ing that leads to identifiable harms helps to overcome the individual
liberty interests wrapped up in parental rights to teach racist doc-
trine to their children.
2. Detailing the Problem
The issue that I identify is not settled science.337 I am not claiming
that the phenomenon I describe is like a physics equation that has
been incorporated into the body of knowledge in a particular disci-
pline the way that, for example, Einstein’s theory of relativity has.338
At the same time, the physical theory I describe is a viable explana-
tion for why racism exists and continues to cause harm throughout
cultures all over the world. The theory I am explaining is falsifiable.
It can be tested and shown to be false or shown to likely be true
through further evidence and study. In a nutshell, this is the problem:
Racism is a self-perpetuating phenomenon in which young hu-
mans are taught to react to other races with fear, disgust, and/or
hatred. While there is no latent racism present in the neural circuitry
of infant or toddler humans, the autonomic system of humans has
evolved in such a way that it is adaptable and can be taught to fear
and show disgust to certain things. Humans are taught racism; it is
not an inborn, inherent phenomenon. But for being exposed to racist
teaching and conditioning, there would be no racist ideology present
in the brain of a human child. When people teach and condition racism
into their children, they produce the problems associated with racism.
Racism causes various health disparities, conditions, and risks. But
for racism, many health problems, conditions, and risks would likely
not exist and in particular, people who belong to oppressed racial
groups would not be at increased risk for certain diseases, poverty,
incarceration, or early death. In the U.S., there is a long history of
racist stratification that permeates society to the point to where even
children who are not taught to be actively racist are conditioned to
react physiologically to people of different races in a negative way
that causes them stress and anxiety. For these reasons, teaching
racist ideology presents a public health crisis both for the children
who are taught racism and for the members of society who are sub-
ject to the remnants of racism that wield their power throughout the
337. See Kelefa Sanneh, The Fight to Redefine Racism, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 19,
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/08/19/the-fight-to-redefine-racism
[https://perma.cc/K44F-879T].
338. See Brian Greene, The Theory of Relativity, Then and Now, SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(Oct. 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/theory-of-relativity-then-and
-now-180956622 [https://perma.cc/2EMR-QSX9].
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social narrative of U.S. culture. Actively seeking to eliminate racism
is, therefore, similar to vaccinating children from polio, instituting
basic nutritional standards for children, and curtailing the advertis-
ing of tobacco. Racism is a public health crisis, and it is caused by
speech and ideology that normally is protected by the First Amend-
ment. The speech that is used to propagate racism in certain con-
texts is not merely speech, rather, like other unprotected categories
of speech, it does something to the hearer. When the hearer is a
child and the speaker is a parent, the trust relationship causes the
children to begin to adopt the ideology, thus the child is conditioned
to have automatic reactions to persons of other races. These reactions
are out of the child’s control. Once a person has been conditioned to
react physiologically to people of different races, it might be impossible
to ever remove the reactions completely, but there are some methods
such as playful exposure to people of other races that are successful
in mitigating the damage caused by the teaching of racist ideology.
By recognizing speech as having physical causes and effects, as
opposed to merely mental ones, it should follow that children, who
are captives of their parents’ speech, should be afforded protections
in particular areas where harms are present. Here, I take up racist
speech and explain that it should not be protected by the First or
Fourteenth Amendments in the context of child-rearing due to the
inherent right of the child to be free from physical harm. Regardless
of this argument, the pragmatic, normative question would remain:
what should we do about it, exactly? In the conclusion, I will raise
a few possibilities, but I will not be arguing that parents should be
arrested and jailed.
3. Speech and the First Amendment
Fighting words,339 inciting a riot,340 and, in one sense, simple
assault341 are “non-physical” speech acts that are not protected under
free speech doctrine.342 Harassing grieving parents at their child’s
funeral by directing anti-LGBTQ343 slurs and religious judgments at
339. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
340. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
341. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“Simple Assault. A person is
guilty of assault if he: . . . (c) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of immi-
nent serious bodily injury.”); see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2002) (providing a
similar definition of “true threats”).
342. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“Those
few categories of speech that the government can regulate or punish—for instance, fraud,
defamation, or incitement—are well established within our constitutional tradition.”).
343. Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay, Transsexual, Queer/Questioning, Intersex, Asexual, Plus
others.
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them is protected when the subject of the speech is a matter of public
concern done in a public forum.344 I am positing one area where
courts have said little but where there appears to be a very clear
right under the First and Fourteenth Amendment: to teach one’s
children racist doctrine. I focus on this area because rejecting dual-
ism would bear heavily on it. This is specifically because neurologi-
cal science shows that this sort of teaching causes physical changes
in the brains of young people and affects behavior.345 In a society
such as ours, which is laden with biased stereotyping and general-
ization, even subliminal auditory cues affect the brain’s reaction to
other races.346 This shows that racist attitudes and group classifica-
tion are so ubiquitous that almost everyone’s autonomic neural
process are affected by them.347 To eliminate this self-realizing and
self-perpetuated race-based conditioning, starting at the inception
of such racist ideas into the society is not only the right thing for the
individual who is taught to be racist but paramount to mitigating
the broad-sweeping indoctrination and insidious racial bias that
prevails in our culture. A recent intersectional study shows that pre-
school children of all races studied have a significant bias against
black boys in particular.348 This prevailing racist indoctrination
presents a public health issue that is deadly serious.349 
Why racism specifically? There are other areas of arguably
harmful indoctrination, but racism has been roundly rejected as a
viable doctrine in the public sphere.350 In contrast, LGBTQ discrimi-
nation has been less rejected as a matter of public concern, though
it is arguably more harmful for the individual who is subjected to
it.351 LGBTQ issues are unfortunately still considered to be matters
of public debate, so I choose racism to exemplify the analytic changes
344. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011).
345. See Bradley D. Mattan et al., The Social Neuroscience of Race-Based and Status-
Based Prejudice, 24 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHOL. 27, 27 (2018) (“Consistent with this
view, greater childhood interracial contact diminishes amygdala response to familiar (vs.
unfamiliar) Black faces.”).
346. See Chad E. Forbes et al., Negative Stereotype Activation Alters Interaction Between
Neural Correlates of Arousal, Inhibition and Cognitive Control, 7 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFEC-
TIVE NEUROSCIENCE 771, 771, 774 (2012).
347. See Mattan et al., supra note 345, at 27–29.
348. Danielle R. Perszyk, et al., Bias at the Intersection of Race and Gender: Evidence
from Preschool-Aged Children, 22 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. e12788 (2019).
349. Bruce G. Link & Jo Phelan, Social Conditions as Fundamental Causes of Disease,
35 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 80, 82 (1995).
350. UNESCO, Racism, THE UNESCO COURIER (Oct. 1960), https://en.unesco.org/cou
rier/october-1960 [http://perma.cc/R7G8-LWZP].
351. Suicide rates among LGBTQIA+ individuals are remarkably higher than any
other group. See Laura Kann et al., Sexual Identity, Sex of Sexual Contacts, and Health-
Related Behaviors Among Students in Grades 9–12—United States and Selected Sites,
2015, 65 SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES 1, 19–21 (2016).
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forced by understanding mental phenomena as physical, since there
is broad agreement in the public sphere that racism needs to be
eliminated.352 Even when the methods to do so are struck down, the
purpose of diversifying society racially and eliminating racism are
widely uncontroversial.353 If we understand that teaching racism
physically alters and, therefore, harms the brains of children, the
Constitution provides little protection for the parents, and the gov-
ernment would be able to intervene to protect the children.354 How-
ever, it is paramount that these protections are not simply read as
being left up to a State’s discretion. If left up to individual States to
promulgate rules protecting children, many if not most children in
states that do not create protections could be out of luck. For this
reason, I argue that children should have a fundamental right defined
by a clear liberty interest protected federally by the First Amendment
right to expression. This protection is firmly couched in the principle
of freedom from harm in the quote preceding this section.355
The particular policies suggested to protect children from their
parents’ racism would need to survive strict scrutiny review, since
they would impinge upon a fundamental right to raise children356 and
would be content-based restriction on free speech and the expression
of ideas.357 I argue that strict scrutiny would be met based on a
352. I am deeply sympathetic and fully entrenched in the plight of LGBTQIA+ persons,
but for my current purposes, I am attempting to keep the examples as uncontroversial as
possible as not to exacerbate the controversial nature of impinging upon parental rights
and free speech.
353. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
722, 725, 747–48 (2007) (finding a compelling interest in reducing racial disparity even
while holding that a school desegregation plan could not rely on race of the students
alone); see also 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301; Civil Rights Act of 1964, P.L. 88-352 (“A[n act t]o
enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the
United States [of America] to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public
accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect con-
stitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the Commission on
Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs, to establish a
Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes.”).
354. See Mattan et al., supra note 345, at 27.
355. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
356. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no State shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.’ We have long recognized that the Amendment’s Due Process Clause, like its Fifth
Amendment counterpart, ‘guarantees more than fair process.’ The Clause also includes
a substantive component that ‘provides heightened protection against government
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.’ The liberty interest
at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court.”) (citations omitted).
357. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2216 (2015) (“Content-based laws—
those that target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconsti-
tutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored
to serve compelling state interests.”).
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compelling interest, the necessity to protect children from neurologi-
cally harmful speech that impacts both the individual and the society
that allows racism to persist even after it has been roundly rejected.
First, what rights do parents have over their children?
4. Parental Rights Under the Constitution
The statist notion that governmental power should supersede
parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and
neglect children is repugnant to American tradition. Nonethe-
less, we have recognized that a state is not without constitu-
tional control over parental discretion in dealing with children
when their physical or mental health is jeopardized.358
The right of parents to control the upbringing of their children
without interference from the state is well established under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment359 as well as under
fundamental rights analysis.360 There is a presumption that children’s
best interests are served by being in the custody of their biological
parents.361 Parents, like all citizens, enjoy the right to free speech
and expression. But these rights are not absolute.362 The Supreme
Court has determined that states may intervene when health of the
child is in danger, whether mental or physical.363
If mental harms can already be protected, why would rejecting
dualism matter? First, the mental health protections are fairly weak
as they only extend into severe abuse and neglect.364 Second, physical
battery and harms of a physical nature are recognized in every State
as grounds for removing custody of a child from a parent, although
such extreme measures are likely not necessary or productive to
eliminate racism from society.365 By understanding these harms as
physical, understanding racist teaching as doing something, the ability
358. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
359. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
510, 518 (1925).
360. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
361. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (“More important, historically it has recognized that
natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”).
362. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571–72 (1942).
363. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1943).
364. See Victor I. Vieth, The Mutilation of a Child’s Spirit: A Call for a New Approach
to Termination of Parental Rights in Cases of Child Abuse, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
727, 747, 751–53 (1994).
365. See Determining the Best Interests of the Child, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION
GATEWAY (2016), https://childwelfare.gov/topics/systemwide/law-policies/statutes/best
-interest [http://perma.cc/AZ56-FV57].
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to protect children falls clearly under the purview of the govern-
ment. This is why understanding mental phenomenon as physical
is so crucial.
5. Specifying the Physical Harm of Racist Ideology
There are no defining moral characteristics of people of particular
races. I assume this fact. When a parent teaches a child that all people
of a group are bad (for example, that people of race (x) are disgusting
sexually or inherently violent) the child is being conditioned to have
instant, unconscious reactions when faced with people of those races.
Not only is the teaching of such doctrine a material misrepresentation
of how things are, the child also does not have the ability to simply
escape the impacts of such doctrine by willing it in the moment.
Over time, when the habit is understood and reinforced, this condi-
tioning produces an automatic reaction upon encountering a person
of race (x).366 Racist teaching and conditioning produces racists. And
in so doing, racist parents condition children to make reliable errors
in judgment about the members of a particular race based on arbi-
trary characteristics ascribed to the race.367 For children who are
subjected to racist doctrine in the home, especially from the start,
the neural circuitry that informs our autonomic neural system to
respond to perceptions with fear and disgust is being habituated to
produce those very phenomena.368
This coercion gets in the way of a person’s ability to make deci-
sions. If the human brain is conditioned to incorrectly perceive the
world in a framework that posits race (which is an arbitrary category
to begin with) as giving rise to particular moral facts about a person,
when the person encounters a person of the target race, the errone-
ous assumption hinders the racially conditioned person’s ability to
connect with and relate to people and thus the environment around
them in a coherent way.369 Some theories suggest methodology that
could help understand how decision making neural pathways are
interrupted when conditioned to think in racist and sexually oppres-
sive ways.370 Racist teaching produces bad decision makers. When
366. See Junhua Dang et al., A New Account of the Conditioning Bias to Out-Groups,
FRONTIERS IN PSYCH. (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg
.2015.00197/full [http://perma.cc/37C2-K99W].
367. See Brooke Emery, The Upbringing of a Creature: The Scope of a Parent’s Right
to Teach Children to Hate, 4 THE MOD. AM. 60, 61–62 (2008).
368. Dang et al., supra note 366.
369. See Andreas Olsson et al., The Role of Social Groups in the Persistence of Learned
Fear, 309 SCIENCE 785, 786 (2005).
370. See PAUL W. GLIMCHER, FOUNDATIONS OF NEUROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 380 (2011).
2019] THE EFFECTS OF REJECTING MIND-BODY DUALISM 121
those making these consistently erroneous, racist assessments stop
and think about their decisions, the racist person is left responding
to the feeling of fear or disgust that they have been conditioned to
feel.371 The racist does not respond to the actual person being as-
sessed, and so there is a disconnect between the perception and the
output of the decision.372
There is a worse result of racist ideology being taught to chil-
dren than simply making bad value judgments. In contrast to the
bad decision maker who contemplates and then decides, the trigger
happy racist is responding to this ancient part of the neural system,
associated with automatic reactions to fear.373 By teaching racism,
the part of the neural system primed evolutionarily to respond to
fear374 has been conditioned to incite protective tasks when con-
fronted with a person of the target race.375 However, the state of
humans inherently is to trust and cooperate, while learned behav-
iors such as racism “inject[ ] . . . distrust and vigilance into social
decision making.”376 When a racist police officer shoots an unarmed
black man, that racist officer will not be lying if he thinks that he
had a reasonable fear.377 By perceiving danger as a matter of ideo-
logical conditioning, a racist officer is not lying when the officer tes-
tifies that they perceived a threat from the black victim. While there
was not much thinking going on, the racist cop’s instinct is to fear.
This type of fear is learned and conditioned through ideology.378 It
is not based on any fact that actually adheres consistently or in a
way that is testable in the world. And this fear manifests as a part of
a physical process.
Racist ideology also impacts people who are not taught to be
actively racist but who are subject to the systems of racism and the
societal perceptions and perpetual falsehoods that are engrained in
social narratives about different races.379 Summarizing, racist ideol-
ogy presents three distinct harms. First, it is harmful to the individ-
ual as a matter of getting in the way of their ability to perceive the
371. See Olsson et al., supra note 369, at 787.
372. See id. at 785–87.
373. Joseph E. LeDoux, Emotion: Clues from the Brain, 46 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 209, 228
(1995).
374. See SAPOLSKY, supra note 40, at 34.
375. Id. at 86.
376. Id. at 39 (“In other words, the default state is to trust, and what the amygdala
does is learn vigilance and distrust.”).
377. Id. at 87.
378. See Emery, supra note 367, at 61–62.
379. See generally Tom Head, The Definition of Institutional Racism: The History and
Implications of Institutional Racism, THOUGHTCO. (July 16, 2019), https://www.thought
co.com/what-is-institutional-racism-721594 [http://perma.cc/YMA9-S4QF].
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world in a coherent way.380 Second, it is harmful to the individual
because it creates general anxiety for the individual in a multiracial
and multicultural world.381 Third, and most importantly, it creates
danger for people of a target race when a racist is in a position of
power within the society.382 Further, people are being, en masse, pas-
sively conditioned due to racist symbolism and categorization based
on historic institutional racism.383
Note: Race, for the purposes herein, is meant to be understood
as a classification that is not related to any normative fact about the
person but rather one that indicates some perceived label based on
color, external feature, place of origin, or labeling related to language,
symbolized religion, or ethnic characteristic.384 For example, if a per-
son who opposes immigration by people from Central America to the
United States teaches their child that people who speak Spanish are
speaking to Diablo and are evil, this is a racist lesson based on the
arbitrary feature of the language being spoken. There is, in reality, no
moral fact associated with the fact that someone is speaking Spanish.
If someone tells their child that Jews are evil and to treat their Jewish
classmates with distrust and antipathy, this is an arbitrary, racist
lesson based on the religious symbolism of a family identifying as a
particular religion. Nothing about being born into any religious faith
or ethnicity suggests normative values about a particular person.
This does not mean that the logical content of the person’s speech or
the religion practiced by a person is not to be understood as produc-
ing a normatively laden field that is subject to criticism. Of course
the things people say and the religions they actually practice can be
problematic and subject to criticism. But any religion that millions
of people associate with is going to have a wide berth of types in it.
The same holds in regards to language being spoken, while obvi-
ously language is more modal and less normative than religion. It
is an important point to assess the difference between religious
labeling and religious practice. Various practices fall under the ban-
ner of any religious label. But the label itself, especially when so
broadly described as “Jewish,” “Muslim,” “Christian,” “Hindu,” or any
broadly described faith followed by millions or billions of people con-
tains little information about the specific beliefs or practice of any
380. See Emery, supra note 367, at 61, 64.
381. Id. at 61–62.
382. See SAPOLSKY, supra note 40, at 87.
383. Head, supra note 379.
384. See generally Erin Blakemore, Race and Ethnicity: How Are They Different?, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/topics/refer
ence/race-ethnicity [http://perma.cc/48YT-82FK].
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given person.385 Symbolically understood, religion cannot be co-
herently understood to inherently give rise to normative criticism
on its own, and even those who subscribe to a particular faith will
have different interpretations and personal relationships with the
religion. Similarly, though more clearly, the fact that someone is from
a particular place, has a particular skin or hair color, speaks a lan-
guage, or the like without any other known fact cannot coherently
give rise to a moral judgment about that person. This is the concept
of race as understood in this Article.
6. The Right to Be Free from the Physical Harms of Racist
Ideology
Children have not enjoyed a robust level of autonomy in rela-
tion to their parents’ methods of child-rearing. Freedom from physi-
cal abuse for children is clear, however.386 Given this, does it follow
that children must be protected from the physical conditioning of
being taught racist ideology? Or, conversely, is this exactly the sort of
thing that should be protected as a matter of parental right? Some-
thing in the middle? To suggest that parents should not be able to
manipulate the physical processes of their children’s minds at all
would be absurd. Dietary choices,387 religious practice,388 and choos-
ing to teach children a musical instrument389 are all examples of de-
cisions that have conditioning effects on children’s minds. However,
parental freedom in those areas only extends so far.390 Parents cannot
make dietary choices such as beer or feeding a child only half the
amount of nutrition the child needs. Teaching a child that God in-
structs them to try to murder their teacher every day is not an ac-
ceptable practice, especially if it leads to the child attempting such
treachery. Forcing a child to practice an instrument to the point of
blood pouring from their fingers and the child developing debilitat-
ing detachment and malnourishment from too much practice is
unacceptable by current standards.
385. See Victoria S. Harrison, The Pragmatics of Defining Religion in a Multi-Cultural
World, INT’L J. PHIL. RELIGION 133, 133 (2006).
386. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
387. See Leann L. Birch & Jennifer O. Fisher, Development of Eating Behaviors Among
Children and Adolescents, PEDIATRICS 539, 542 (1998).
388. See Hannah Newton, The Sick Child in Early Modern England, 1580–1720, 38
ENDEAVOUR 122, 128 (2014).
389. See Ewa A. Miendlarzewska & Wiebke J. Trost, How Musical Training Affects
Cognitive Development: Rhythm, Reward and Other Modulating Variables, FRONTIERS
IN NEUROSCIENCE (Jan. 20, 2014), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnins.2013
.00279/full [http://perma.cc/T969-28QQ].
390. See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Del. 1991).
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Is teaching a child racism like one of these practices and thus
easily incorporated into the existing set of protections that exist for
children? I think that it is. It is more like those than the religious
practices of, for example, teaching a child to be respectful to people,
giving alms to the poor, and keeping one’s vices in check.391 These
practices are found in many religious faiths, and they do not consti-
tute harm in the way that teaching racist ideology, which is also a
belief many derive from some religious faiths, does.392 Instead of
classifying the conditioning of bad ideologies in with other abusive
practices, constructing the right might benefit from its own founda-
tions and analysis. Even if the harms caused by racist conditioning
are physical, they are also content based, not merely about a harm-
ful or already illegal practice or process. What would the fundamen-
tal right to a freedom from this unique type of harm look like for
children? Would we wind up in the same place we found the status of
mental tort harms that were understood as not being merely mental
where the pre-existing reasons for the distinction between mental
and physical make a lot of sense? The analysis should begin with
what we know about the underlying interests on either side and the
purposes behind protecting those interests. Here, the interest of the
parent to teach their children as they see fit is pitted against the
child’s freedom to not be taught racism. What purposes do these
interests serve exactly?
On the side of the parent, there is a free speech interest and an
interest in the rearing of one’s child in the best way they see fit. Free
speech as a doctrine serves two overarching purposes that need to
be addressed here.393 One, the ability for ideas, even and especially
fringe ideas, to enter the realm of public debate, thus adding to the
complexity and robustness of discourse.394 There are some ideas that
are low value speech that do not receive robust protection.395 While
problems drawing the line between speech that has no value and
speech that should be protected is always going to be difficult, there
are extremes that can help define the boundaries of our analysis. I
offer a couple of extremes for purposes of analysis.
391. See generally Why Give? Religious Roots of Charity, HARV. DIVINITY SCH. (Nov. 26,
2018), https://hds.harvard.edu/news/2013/12/13/why-give-religious-roots-charity# [http://
perma.cc/L2SY-QK5Z].
392. See, e.g., id.; Deborah L. Hall et al., Why Don’t We Practice What We Preach? A
Meta-Analytic Review of Religious Racism, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 126, 127
(2010).
393. See KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 5–6 (6th ed.
2016).
394. See id.
395. See Victoria L. Killion, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CATEGORIES OF SPEECH (Congres-
sional Research Service 2019).
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At one extreme, it seems obvious that teaching children to par-
ticipate in criminal activity is unacceptable. On the other hand, it
seems obvious that teaching children that the law is not correct in
some way and should be changed is acceptable, particularly if the
parent enforces that following the flawed law is prudent. Taking
these, we start out with two categorically different teachings. Now,
how are they different? Or, to frame the question more clearly, what
are the defining characteristics that make these different lessons
fall into their respective categories of acceptable and not acceptable
behavior? I argue that the consequences of the lessons tell the story.
Teaching a child to commit a criminal act sets that child up for failure.
If a parent teaches a child that stealing is the only way that the child
will ever get their favorite candy, that they should want the candy,
and that the child should steal the candy because they want it, the
parent conditions the child to break the law and that, in fact, break-
ing the law is good. Breaking the law tends to get people in trouble.
If someone develops the habit of breaking a law, that person is habitu-
ated into a way of life that will likely lead them to running into legal
troubles. To teach a child to act in a particular way is different than
discussing with and teaching a child to understand how the law it-
self is arguably incorrect, which positions a child to understand how
they can relate to legal standards even if they do not agree.
The case of a parent teaching racist ideology is remarkably
different. Their lessons are not about the law and how it needs to
change. The racist parent is teaching the child, falsely, that there is
some indelible quality present in persons of a particular race.396
There is no argument being made about the political system or the
possibility of changing the law. Instead, it is a morally laden meta-
physical claim that conditions a false belief into a child’s theory of
mind.397 For this reason, the first overarching purpose of free speech
doctrine, to introduce a broad base of ideas to the public, is not being
served. It is more similar in deception to telling a person to meet in
the woods in a murder conspiracy. However, if racism has been condi-
tioned into people through often nefarious cultural misunderstand-
ings, which I think it certainly has, the “true believer” is not culpable
for having the belief. And so participating in the process by which
racism takes hold of the young mind should likely not have the
required intent to give rise to criminal charges. And given the state
of our current prison system,398 the outcomes involved in taking
396. See Lawrence A. Hirschfeld, Children’s Developing Conceptions of Race, in HAND-
BOOK OF RACE, RACISM, AND THE DEVELOPING CHILD 37, 42 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008).
397. See generally id.
398. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON
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such measures to rid our society of racism likely bear against the
idea of criminal culpability for conditioning a child to react in racist
ways to persons of other races.
On the other hand, an individual speaker has an interest in
being free from encumbrance and fear of attack on their ideas by the
State. That the State may not intervene into a person’s mental pro-
cesses, their ideas, is a deeply protected interest.399 But it also has
its limits.400 In the case of the racist parent, I argue that the limit has
been reached because of the physical effects that can be observed by
the impact of such teaching on a child. If the issue was merely that an
individual or group of individuals who have reached the age of major-
ity wish to band together to form a coalition to promote racism, my
argument would not adhere. But here, there is a distinct difference.
The child does not have any freedom to just walk away and in most
cases does not even have the chance to rebuke their parent if they
disagree. When there is a vulnerable hearer involved, the argument
applies and the doctrinal approach changes. In the case at issue, the
child is a captive audience and should be considered as such.401 What
is a captive audience exactly and do children fall under this category
based on existing doctrine?
People do not have unfettered freedom to bombard others with
speech against their will.402 Falsely imprisoning people to inculcate
them with political propaganda is clearly not okay. Conversely, teach-
ing racist propaganda in a public forum to consenting adults403 and
wearing potentially offensive jackets even where people who might
be offended are required to be404 are examples of protected speech
POLICY INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html
[http://perma.cc/K2KL-FQ4S].
399. Sherry F. Colb, How the Government May, and May Not, Punish People’s Thoughts
and Words, VERDICT JUSTIA (May 2, 2012), https://verdict.justia.com/2012 /05/02/how-the
-government-may-and-may-not-punish-peoples-thoughts-and-words [http://perma.cc
/4RB5-UVKJ].
400. Id.
401. See LINDA J. GOTTLIEB, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME: A FAMILY THERAPY
AND COLLABORATIVE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO AMELIORATION 210 (Charles C. Thomas 2012).
402. Patrick M. Garry, Captive Audience, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://
www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/895/captive-audience [http://perma.cc/6CDA-575P].
403. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (striking down an Act that
“punishes persons who ‘advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or propriety’ of violence ‘as
a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform’; or who publish or circulate or
display any book or paper containing such advocacy; or who ‘justify’ the commission of
violent acts ‘with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines
of criminal syndicalism’; or who ‘voluntarily assemble’ with a group formed ‘to teach or
advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.’ ”).
404. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1971) (“In this regard, persons con-
fronted with Cohen’s jacket [in a courthouse] were in a quite different posture than, say,
those subjected to the raucous emissions of sound trucks blaring outside their residences.
Those in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid further bombardment of
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not subject to state sanction. However, speech that subjects people
to unwanted messages when in the home can be sanctioned and
curtailed.405 While the home is the quintessential example of where
people have the right to be protected from speech by the state, the
Supreme Court has said that the captive audience doctrine should
only protect hearers when “substantial privacy interests are being
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”406 The fear is that ex-
tending the right for the state to curtail speech any further can “em-
power a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal
predilections.”407 In the case of hearing racist teachings in the home,
it is the very relationship natural to the home that is at question. Be-
cause the two share a home, the child’s freedom and the parent’s
freedom in that very home are at issue. Furthermore, children gener-
ally do not have freedom of association over their parents’ wishes ex-
cept in rare cases, and even where they do, they rely on others to
invoke the rights for them.408 This may seem to cut against the case
of children having a superseding negative freedom from harmful racist
speech. But when understood in relation to the captive audience doc-
trine, it supports their neural autonomy.
The very fact that children are not free to leave their home via
freedom of association rights means that they are being forced by
the state to remain in the home in a way that an adult in a similar
situation is not.409 Imagine a spouse or a roommate who attempts to
coerce housemates with racist speech. While there might be no prac-
tical way to leave the situation immediately and be considerably
better to endure than the alternatives, a fundamental autonomy
right exists for an adult in that situation to leave the home. Children
should be understood to be the most extremely captive audiences
their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes. And, while it may be that one has a more
substantial claim to a recognizable privacy interest when walking through a courthouse
corridor than, for example, strolling through Central Park, surely it is nothing like the
interest in being free from unwanted expression in the confines of one’s own home.”)
(emphasis added).
405. See, e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (upholding a law
that allows citizens to stop the post office from delivering advertisements, thus undermin-
ing the senders’ claimed right to communicate); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949)
(“It is an extravagant extension of due process to say that because of it a city cannot forbid
talking on the streets through a loud speaker in a loud and raucous tone. Surely such an
ordinance does not violate our people’s ‘concept of ordered liberty’ so as to require federal
intervention to protect a citizen from the action of his own local government.”).
406. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
407. Id.
408. See Kimberley Brownlee, Freedom of Association: It’s Not What You Think, 35
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 274–75 (2015).
409. See Constantine Theophilopoulos, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the
Distinction Between Testimonial and Non-Testimonial Evidence, 127 S. AFRICAN L.J. 107,
120–22 (2010).
128 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:077
allowed by current standards. If the captive audience doctrine exists
at all, it should exist to protect those who have the least autonomy.
Children cannot divert their eyes or walk out when confronted with
racist teaching the way they could when confronted with an offen-
sive jacket in public or the way an adult could when faced with the
same at home. Since they are bound in such stark ways under other,
more fundamental doctrines like parental association rights, their
physical neurological well-being is appropriately analyzed as a captive
audience. When the rights are balanced against each other, I argue
that the child’s interest is the only one that should weigh at all, be-
cause in the instance of racist teaching, it is the child’s brain, a physi-
cal entity, that is being harmed in substantial ways.
No countervailing liberty interest in the freedom to speak one’s
mind outweighs another person’s right to not be forced to develop
physical reactions to erroneously proscribed environmental stimuli
such as those tracking race. By understanding the physically coer-
cive process happening when a person’s autonomic system is primed
to be racist, it allows us to place the phenomenon alongside other
physical abuses such as hitting, nutrition deprivation, and condition-
ing criminal ideology that manifests in criminal behavior. If seen
through a dualist lens, however, the child’s right to be free from racist
teaching is likely to be cast in a metaphysical light that leaves it
protected only as merely mental. By understanding racist teaching
as a neuro-conditioning process that is categorically and conceptu-
ally physical, the harm children experience when taught to be racist
is properly understood as a physical harm that warrants State in-
tervention to avoid.
7. Counter-Argument from Religious Freedom
People who couch their racist beliefs and teachings in religious
freedom might counter that by allowing the state to intervene into
their child-rearing practices, their religious beliefs are being decided
for them and that the state is in so doing endorsing religious prac-
tice. While it is true that the government may not endorse particu-
lar religious faiths, this argument would actually bear in the other
direction if analyzed properly.410 If the racist teaching causes physi-
cal harm, then to consider the right to exact that type of physical
harm as being privileged or special in ways that merely mental harms
are requires positing a dualist distinction between the mind and the
body. To do so requires the state to make a philosophical choice about
410. See Establishment Clause, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex
/establishment_clause [http://perma.cc/TKB8-KE3F] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
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the nature of the mind, and that type of choice is a broad sweeping,
faith-based choice that smells a lot like a religious endorsement. The
argument that state action to intervene into a physically abusive
situation is an impingement upon religious freedom tantamount to
an endorsement of religion makes an ironic error in logic. Since the
claim relies on the state endorsing a particular view of the mind
that cannot be justified by empirical observation, it begs the state
to make a faith-based assertion that is itself closer to religious belief
endorsement than to carefully analyze and organize the physical
impacts of people’s conduct. Either these impacts are observable, or
they are not. Merely hypothetical harms, like merely hypothetical
or quasi-scientific methods of analysis, should not matter when it
comes to the law. The reason is the same as one of the reasons that
teaching racist doctrines is so bad. Relying on unfalsifiable, quasi-
sound methods of discovery produces consistent errors. For this rea-
son, things that are not subject to logical or empirical proof are not
subjects into which the state ought to interject. Legal standards should
not be subject to assumptions bound up in equally speculative notions.
The thing that we cannot prove is that which the notion of dualism
relies upon for support. Things that can be proven are important in
the face of the law. Things that cannot are fun to speculate about,
but they should not serve as cornerstones for the legal system. The
observable proof of the harmful effects of racism are not in dispute.411
The impacts of teaching racism are well documented and can be ac-
curately understood as physical from the point at which racist con-
cepts are conditioned into malleable young minds. If dualism is
rejected, the way racist doctrine affects the mind of a child is properly
seen as similar to material misrepresentations, unprotected hate
speech, yelling fire in a theater, the event that leads to an onset of
manslaughter, assault, and defamation. All of these types of speech
acts do things. They do not merely exist in a mental realm where
their outcomes are not predictably realized.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I explained how mind-body dualism impacts the
law, and how accepting physicalist notions of the mind would impact
the values bound up in legal doctrine. For many areas of the law
411. See David E. Broockman, Distorted Communication, Unequal Representation: Con-
stituents Communicate Less to Representatives Not of Their Race, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 307,
317 (2014); Brea L. Perry et al., Racial and Gender Discrimination in the Stress Process:
Implications for African American Women’s Health and Well-Being, 56 SOC. PERSP. 25, 36,
39; Physiological & Psychological Impact of Racism and Discrimination for African-Ameri-
cans, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, https://www.apa.org/pi/oema/resources
/ethnicity-health/racism-stress.aspx [http://perma.cc/BJS4-259R] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
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where mind-body dualism has been prevalent, a physicalist picture
would have little or no impact on the law. For instance, mens rea re-
quirements are not necessarily valued differently because they are
physical in nature. Tort law maintains some good reasons for the
mental/physical harm distinction, but new arguments utilizing neuro-
science to explain that mental harms are not merely mental are
potentially available to overcome limitations on recovery for mental
harms. Bodily versus testimonial evidence, even when both seen as
physical in nature, still maintain a distinction in kind that the law
supports notwithstanding metaphysical unification. Conversely, in
First Amendment doctrine, a wave of change seems to be in order.
I argued here that in the case of a parent’s right to teach a child racist
doctrine, no First Amendment or fundamental rights protections
should override the child’s right to be free from the harm of racist
indoctrination. The question that seems to follow from this is “what
should be done?” How could parents who teach their children racism
and bigotry be stopped? How could racism as an idea be mitigated
or eliminated from society? This is an impossible question to answer
completely. People usually do not realize that they are racist, and
most of us have racial biases, even when we try to correct them.412
Even decades after the Civil Rights Movement has compelled legis-
lation413 and forced the courts414 to raise consciousness surrounding
the seriousness of racial prejudice, it persists. The hope is that as
the society grows more diverse, things will continue to improve. But
with recent regressions in hate crime violence415 and racist political
speech reemerging in public discourse,416 our culture seems to be in
a sort of malaise when it comes to continuing racial progress to the
point of justice. By imploring political leaders and policy experts to
take up this issue, there can be more directed legislative and admin-
istrative action to confront racism as a public health issue that can
and should be treated like a disease.
412. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Process-
ing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004). See generally MAHZARIN BANAJI
& ANTHONY GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE xii–xiii (Delacorte
Press, 2013).
413. See Harold A. McDougall, For Critical Race Practitioners: Race, Racism and
American Law, 46 HOW. L.J. 1, 19–20, 39 (2002).
414. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017) (“The duty to confront racial
animus in the justice system is not the legislature’s alone. Time and again, this Court has
been called upon to enforce the Constitution’s guarantee against state-sponsored racial
discrimination in the jury system.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954).
415. There were more than 1000 more hate crime incidents in 2017 than in 2016. Com-
pare FBI, Hate Crime Statistics 2017, Table 1, FBI (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime
/2017/tables/table-1.xls [http://perma.cc/MUU9-3W57] with FBI, Hate Crime Statistics
2016, Table 1, FBI (2016), https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2016/tables/table-1 [http://perma
.cc/8PHQ-TY9L].
416. Jessie Daniels, The Algorithmic Rise of the “Alt-Right,” 17 CONTEXTS 60, 61 (2018).
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The same model of consciousness raising seen around the Civil
Rights Movement, though woefully incomplete, can be hoped for in
the LGBTQ movement. But it could be even more difficult to over-
come. I was not around during the pre–Civil Rights era, so I cannot
attest to how reactive people were at the suggestion of civil rights
for Blacks. But I have witnessed the reactions of people who vehe-
mently reject that LGBTQ people have equal rights. I have also seen
the Supreme Court treat LGBTQ rights as if they do not matter as
much as racial equality.417 Presently, the issue seems to be treated
as if it has a different character than racial protections. Maybe it does,
and arguably that character of the harm of anti-LGBTQ ideology is
even worse or on par with our racism problem.418
There is also Constitutional doctrine to consider. Since limiting
a parent’s right to teach their kids to be racist bigots would affect a
fundamental right to parent, substantive due process consider-
ations, the right to free speech, and religious freedom, any regula-
tion passed to correct it would have to survive strict scrutiny.419 This
417. See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723,
1725–27, 1752 (2018).
418. In addition to the well documented extermination by the state of LGBTQIA
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means that the regulation would have to serve a compelling govern-
ment interest and be necessary to do so and be done in the least
restrictive way possible.420
So what would a fundamental negative right against the bad
ideas of one’s parents look like and how would it be enforced? First,
the right would best be grounded in the First Amendment. There
are a couple of reasons for this. The rights afforded under the First
Amendment have been guaranteed great protections, and that pro-
tection is only being increased.421 While fundamental rights analysis
is also available, the specific doctrine of freedom of expression natu-
rally extends into this area.422 The parent’s right to speak and the
child’s right to expression will be on an equal footing to begin the
balancing analysis.
Second, enforcement could, like in Brown v. Board of Education,
come in a variety of ways that are specifically tailored to the most
egregious situations but to also provide widespread programming to
eliminate implicit biases that do not appear to be egregious but that
have perpetually insidious outcomes.423 Taking into account the fact
that children separated from their families have on average worse out-
comes than those who are not,424 the government should deal with this
on a case by case basis, employing a) literature distribution, b) family
counseling, c) logic and critical thinking for children, and d) general
incentives for people who overcome their biases.
Neither the harms nor the cause of racism are always obvi-
ous.425 By understanding racism in a physicalist framework, it is un-
derstood properly as a serious and widespread health problem. We
could and should treat racism as if it is a disease instead of treating it
as if it is privileged and protected ideology. While the dangers of an
420. Id.
421. See Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371,
2378 (2018). But see Justice Kagan describing how the First Amendment is being
weaponized, expanded in a very troubling way to protect ideological resistance to
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S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“And maybe most alarming, the majority
has chosen the winners by turning the First Amendment into a sword, and using it
against workaday economic and regulatory policy.”).
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POLITICAL THOUGHT 304, 304–06 (Gregory Claeys ed., 2013).
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overreaching state should always be on our minds, the overreach in
this case is the broad reach of ingrained racism throughout society,
which is endorsed by the democratic state and pervades our system.
The institutions of government perpetuate this engrained ideology
as long as it remains in the automatic processes of the common citizen
and within the societal narrative. Preventing the spread and continua-
tion of racism should be undertaken at the most fundamental levels
and stopped in its tracks before it can affect the minds of young peo-
ple. By recognizing the physiological harms that are racist ideological
teaching and conditioning, society can defend itself from racism by ap-
propriate means and in a way that furthers our collective interest
in the free exchange of ideas and maximizing personal autonomy.
